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STATE OF IDAHO LA"'I CLERK 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors and JOSE AGUILAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
NATHAN COONROD and PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE CENTER, an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES I 
through X, employees of one or more of 
the Defendants, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho, in and for Canyon County 
Honorable GREGORY M. CULET, District Judge 
Steven K. Tolman 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. and 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock 
and 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Supreme Court No. 36980 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET, Presiding 
Steven K. Tolman, TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C., P. O. Box 1276, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Steven J. Hippler, GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP., P. O. Box 2720, 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock, P. O. Box 2774, Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Byron V. Foster, P. O. Box 1584, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Defendants. 
COMES NOW Steven R. Newman, M.D., by and through undersigned counsel, 
and pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and responds to Plaintiffs' 
Objection to Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum of Costs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs object to Dr. Newman's Memorandum of Costs; specifically objecting 
to the costs as a matter of right associated with Dr. Blahd's deposition and Dr. LeBaron's 
deposition. Plaintiffs further object to Dr. Newman's discretionary costs on the basis that to 
award these costs would not be in the interest of justice. Dr. Newman submits that the costs 
associated with Dr. Blahd's deposition and Dr. LeBaron's deposition are costs that were 
reasonably and necessarily incurred, as Dr. Newman had to pay these costs in order to take their 
depositions. As for Dr. Newman's discretionary costs, said costs were necessary, exceptional, 
and reasonably incurred and should, in the interest of justice, be awarded. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Dr. Newman Should Be Awarded, As a Matter of Right, the Fees That Dr. 
Blahd and Dr. LeBaron Charged for Their Depositions. 
1. Dr. Blahd 
As the Court is aware, it allowed Dr. Newman to take Dr. Blahd's deposition a 
week prior to trial, as he was a foundational expert for plaintiffs' experts Dr. Blaylock and Dr. 
Lapinel as to whether they were familiar with the standard of care applicable to Dr. Newman. 
Dr. Newman had to depose Dr. Blahd to confirm that he had spoken with Dr. Blaylock and Dr. 
Lapinel and to confirm whether they had the requisite knowledge ofthe standard of care. Dr. 
Blahd's hourly rate for his deposition is $350.00 per hour. If Dr. Newman had not paid this fee, 
DEFENDANT STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D.'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT STEVEN 
R. NEWMAN, M.D.'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 2 
"ll=:"ll=: 
Client: 1261456.1 
he would not have been able to depose Dr. Blahd. Accordingly, the Court should award this as a 
cost as a matter of right to Dr. Newman. 
2. Dr. LeBaron 
Plaintiffs object to the share of costs that Dr. Newman paid for Dr. LeBaron's 
deposition on the basis that Dr. LeBaron was plaintiffs' family practice expert; that Dr. Newman 
did not seek Dr. LeBaron's deposition; that Dr. Newman's counsel asked very few questions at 
Dr. LeBaron's deposition; and that counsel learned that Dr. LeBaron would not be testifying as 
an emergency medicine physician expert. Dr. Newman disagrees. 
In their initial expert disclosures, filed January 15, 2008, plaintiffs identified Dr. 
LeBaron as a standard of care expert against Dr. Newman. See Plaintiffs' Expert Witness 
Disclosure, attached as Exhibit A to the Second Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of 
Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum of Costs. Dr. LeBaron was deposed on June 3, 2008. 
Since Dr. LeBaron had been identified as a standard of care expert against Dr. Newman in the 
Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure, it was necessary for Dr. Newman to depose Dr. LeBaron to 
ascertain what his opinions were. While Dr. LeBaron indicated that he was not familiar with the 
standard of care of an emergency medicine physician in his deposition, he indicated that he had 
opinions as to Dr. Newman's care from a family practitioner's view and that Dr. Newman had 
breached the standard of care. In February 2009, Dr. Newman moved in limine to exclude Dr. 
LeBaron's testimony, and it was not until the April 22, 2009 hearing on Dr. Newman's Motion 
in Limine that plaintiffs conceded that Dr. LeBaron would not be stating a standard of care 
opinion against Dr. Newman at trial. 
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In short, Dr. Newman's share of Dr. LeBaron's fees for taking his deposition were 
reasonably incurred and necessary, because prior to and following Dr. LeBaron's deposition, it 
appeared that plaintiffs were going to elicit standard of care testimony from Dr. LeBaron against 
Dr. Newman at trial. 
B. Dr. Newman's Discretionary Costs Were Necessary, Exceptional, Reasonably 
Incurred, and They Should Be Awarded. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(D) sets the standard for which 
discretionary costs may be awarded. It states: 
Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, 
or in an amount in excess ofthat listed in subparagraph (C), may 
be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of 
justice be assessed against the adverse party •. The trial court, in 
ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in the 
memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such 
specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. 
In the absence of any objection to such an item of discretionary 
costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such items of 
discretionary costs and shall make express findings supporting 
such disallowance. 
In Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 90, 803 
P.2d 993,996 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court held that Judge Hart did not abuse his discretion 
when he awarded Idaho Power over $40,000.00 in costs as a matter of right against the plaintiff 
and over $84,000.00 in discretionary costs against the plaintiff: 
The trial court found that the discretionary costs awarded to IPC 
against the plaintiffs were reasonable and justified and that the 
interests of justice required plaintiffs to reimburse IPC for those 
costs. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding these costs. 
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Similarly, in Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, Ringert and Clark, Chtd., 116 
Idaho 359,365, 775 P.2d 1201, 1207 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Judge May's 
decision awarding the defendants their costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs: 
Based upon that judgment in favor ofthe firm on its counterclaim, 
the trial court found "that defendants are entitled to their costs 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C) - Costs as a Matter of Right -
in the amount of$4,804.75. Further, [the trial court found] that 
defendants are entitled to their costs pursuant to LR.C.P. 
54(d)(I)(D) - Discretionary Costs - in the amount of 
$16,247.99." The record supports the trial court's determination 
that the defendant counterclaimants were the prevailing parties, 
and accordingly we affirm the trial court's award of costs. 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has not had a problem with trial courts awarding prevailing 
defendants their requested discretionary costs. 
The discretionary costs that Dr. Newman incurred were necessary, exceptional, 
and reasonable. Dr. Bosley's fees as an expert are similar to plaintiffs' expert Dean Lapinel, 
M.D., and much less than Dr. Blaylock's and Dr. LeBaron's expert fees. Plaintiffs included their 
experts' travel and lodging costs in their request for discretionary costs. Plaintiffs also are 
seeking their out-of-town travel costs, just as Dr. Newman's counsel have. And, like Dr. 
Newman's counsel, plaintiffs have requested costs for photocopies, messenger services, and 
computer research. The cost of having an interpreter for Mr. Aguilar's deposition was necessary, 
because he is not fluent in English. Even Judge Wilper, in a decision plaintiffs attached to their 
Objection, Jones, et al. v. Anesthesiology Associates of Treasure Valley, et al., concluded that the 
discretionary costs incurred by a defendant in a medical malpractice case are reasonably 
incurred. 
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While plaintiffs point to Judge Wilper's decision in Jones to support their 
argument, Dr. Newman calls the Court's attention to another decision authored by Judge Wilper 
in the case of Webster v. Zimmerman, et al. Gabiola Aff., Exhibit B. In that case, the Websters 
brought a medical malpractice action against defendants Dr. Zimmerman, Dr. Binegar, and 
CRNA Westerlund. The defendants obtained a defense verdict, and Judge Wilper entered an 
order granting all of the defendants their costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs, over 
$73,000.00 to Dr. Bingar and Westerlund, and over $73,000.00 to Dr. Zimmerman. 
Finally, plaintiffs' argument that awarding Dr. Newman his discretionary costs 
would not serve the interest of justice begs the question. Plaintiffs' counsel surely informed the 
plaintiffs that there would be expenses involved with prosecuting their case. Plaintiffs' counsel 
also did not take this case for free, and rightly so. Plaintiff attorneys are in the business of 
prosecuting cases, knowing that costs are involved, and evaluating cases as an business 
investment, hoping to obtain a verdict. Plaintiff attorneys should be compensated for their work. 
That is their business. To argue that a double standard should be set for the award of 
discretionary costs to a prevailing plaintiff and not to a prevailing defendant is a circular 
argument. Such a double standard is not only contrary to Rule 54(d)(1)(D), but bad policy. 
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Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, Dr. Newman respectfully 
requests that the Court grant him his requested costs as a matter of right and his requested 
discretionary costs. 
DATED this L~ ~ay of June, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By LJIW1 e ~w4-t~ 
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PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - P. 1 
Case No. CV 05-5781 
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE 
" 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. Comstock, 
of Comstock & Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and pursuant to the Court's 
Scheduling Order and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26, hereby discloses their list of expert 
witnesses to be called at the trial of this case: 
1. Paul Blaylock M.D., FACEP 
Provid~nce Medical Group 
4500 N.W. Malheur Avenue 
Portland, OR 97229 
Dr. Blaylock is a Board Certified emergency medicine physician who at present 
practices for Providence Medical Group in Portland, Oregon. He has practiced medicine in 
Oregon and Wash ington for over 35 years and has practiced emergency medicine for over 
30 years. 
A. Subject matter of expected testimony. 
Dr. Blaylock is expected to testify regarding the applicable standard of health care 
practice as to the work-up and diagnosis of pulmonary emboli. He will testify and comment 
on the testimony of Defendants and their disclosed experts witnesses. Dr. Blaylock may 
also testify based upon any medical literature which he deems appropriate to support or 
substantiate his testimony. He may employ illustrative aids in rendering testimony. If and 
when such medical lite~ature and illustrative aids are identified, this disclosure will be 
supplemented. Dr. Blaylock may also testify so as to explain to the jury the general nature 
of emergency medicine, the purposes and goals of emergency medicine and other 
background information to assist the jury in understanding and interpreting the facts 
involved in this litigation. 
B. Substance of Facts. 
. Dr. Blaylock has reviewed the medical records of Maria A. Aguilar generated by 
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Primary Health, Dr. Coonrod, Mercy Medical Center, West Valley Regional Medical Center, 
Canyon County Paramedics, Boise Gastroenterology Associates, st. AJphonsus RMC, 
Canyon County Coroner, Pennywise Drug, Robin King, D.C. and the Death Certificate. In 
addition, he has reviewed the depositions of Defendants Newman, Long and Chai. 
. It is expected that Dr. Blaylock will also review depositions taken in the future of 
various experts and/or treating health care providers. He is also expected to review other 
literature and materials regarding the subject matter of this litigation. 
Dr. Blaylock will testify as to his understanding as to the facts of this case based 
upon his review of the above-referenced documents and depositions. 
CAVEAT 
It should be understood that the opinions set forth below, while held by Dr. Blaylock 
to a reasonable medical certainty or probability, are necessarily preliminary opinions 
because the deposition testimony of Dr. Coonrod has yet to be secured. The activities and 
testimony of Dr. Coonrod may directly impact Dr. Blaylock's opinions regarding Drs. Long, 
Newman and Chai. Without an understanding of the communications which Dr. Coonrod 
had with the emergency departments at Mercy Medical Center and West Valley Regional 
Medical Center; and without an understanding of the nature and content of any 
conversations Dr. Coonrod. may have had with the other Defendants, it is impossible to 
render final opinions concerning the activities of the health care providers involved in 
providing medical care and treatment to Mrs. Aguilar. While Dr. Blaylock does intend to 
offer opinions regarding the activities of Dr. Coonrod in this matter, his final opinions must 
await the deposition testimony of Dr. Coonrod. Therefore, with that in mind and based 
upon his training, background, education and experience; Dr. Blaylock's preliminary 
opinions are, at this time, as follows: 
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C. Substance of Opinions. 
. The opinions expressed by Dr. Blaylock. herein are opinions he holds to a 
reasonable medical certainty or probability. 
When Maria Aguilar presented at the Emergency Department at MMC on May 27, 
2003, she had been sent there by her primary physician, Dr. Coonrod. The records of Dr. 
Coonrod at Primary Health indicate that Dr. Coonrod had called the ED and spoken to the 
ED physician and had, in addition, sent along with Mrs. Aguilar the EKG and chest x-ray 
taken at Primary Health on that date. At least with regard to the EKG, it was abnormal and 
indicated changes indicative of either a cardiac or pulmonary origin. These changes, 
including T -wave inversion, were indicative of right heart strain or stress which would lead a 
prudent ED physician, in May of 2003 in Nampa, Idaho, to perform tests to determine 
whether the etiology of the EKG pattern was indeed cardiac or pulmonary. Dr. Long, in 
order to comport with the applicable standard of health care practice, in addition to the 
tests he ordered that day; should have ordered a D-Dimer, chest CT or V/Q scan. Blood 
clotting studies and/or a pulmonary angiogram should have been ordered if the screening 
tests aforementioned were abnormal. One or more of these studies would, more probably 
than not, have indicated that Mrs. Aguilar was suffering from a showering of pulmonary 
emboli. 
In addition, the symptoms which Maria was exhibiting while in the ED on that date; 
along with her medical history, called for an investigation into whether her signs and 
symptoms were related to pulmonary embolus. Dr. Long's differential diagnosis should 
have included pulmonary embolus and it should have been either ruled in or ruled out. 
However, other than indicating in his deposition that he considered PE and ruled it out 
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based upon his examination, Dr. Long did nothing to appropriately investigate the 
probability that Mrs. Aguilar was indeed suffering from PE. You cannot rule out a PE based 
on physical examination alone. There is a well established principle in emergency 
medicine that if you suspect a PE, you must rule it out since the consequence of not doing 
it is a high likelihood of morbidity and/or death. 
Dr. Long's clinical impression of atypical chest pain and probable GERD is at Odds 
with the EKG findings and is simply not a reasonable conclusion based on her history and 
clinical presentation. The pattern shown by the EKG from Primary Health, coupled with the 
EKG ordered by Dr. Long (which contained a worsening pattern) is not seen in patients 
suffering from GERD. 
In addition, trie chest x-ray taken on May 27, 2003, was not normal and suggested 
right heart strain and cardiomegaly. This too should have been another red flag to Dr. Long 
because cardiomegaly is or can be indicative of right heart strain caused by pulmonary 
emboli .. Even without any information from Dr. Coonrod's office, Dr. Long possessed 
sufficient information from the work-up he performed and the testing he obtained to reach a 
differential diagnosiS of pulmonary emboli and his failure to rule this out was a violation of 
the standard of care. Routine PE screening then could have led to the diagnosis. 
Dr. Long's discharge of Mrs. Aguilar, without the performance of appropriate testing 
as set forth above, was a violation of the standard of health care practice applicable to him 
on May 27,2003. If he was not going to do the work-up, he should have admitted the 
patient for additional work-up. Dr .. Long's violations of the standard of health care practice 
for an emergency physician on May 27, 2003 were a substantial factor in the death of Mrs. 
Aguilar. 
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With regard to Dr. Chai, it is understood that he is a cardiologist. However, even a 
specialist like Dr. Chai, once he calls a patient back the ED for further testing, has a duty to 
form a differential diagnosis and follow up on that differential with appropriate testing and 
'. 
examination. In conjunction with his order for a cardiac catheterization, Dr. Chai, in order 
to comport with the standard of health care practice applicable to him on May 28,2003, 
shouid have ordered, as should Dr. Long, appropriate tests to determine if Mrs. Aguilar's 
signs and symptoms were pulmonary in nature. Merely ordering a cardiac work-up under 
these circumstances was insufficient. The EKG changes which he references in his May 
28, 2003 History and Physical give rise to an obligation to determine whether those 
changes are cardiac or pulmonary in origin. Part of Dr. Chai's responsibility in conjunction 
with his admission work-up of this patient should have included one or more of the tests set 
forth above. (Same PE screening test as for Dr. Long.) Had he done so, it would have 
obviated the need for cardiac catheterization and resulted in Mrs. Aguilar receiving life 
saving treatment. It is Dr. Blaylock's opinion, to a reasonable medical probability, that in 
failing to perform a proper work-up and in failing to appropriately follow up concerning the 
signs and symptoms exhibited by Mrs. Aguilar; that Dr. Chai violated the standard of health 
care practice applicable to him and that these failures were a substantial factor in Mrs. 
Aguilar's demise. 
It is intended that Dr. Blaylock will speak to a cardiologist in Idaho regarding the 
standard of care for Dr. Chai. Once this conversation takes place, this disclosure will be 
supplemented. 
Dr. Coonrod, who saw Mrs. Aguilar multiple times including May 27, 30, 2003 and 
also June 4, 2003, the date of her death; violated the standard of care and was medically 
negligent in not ordering the PE screening tests (as outlined above regarding Dr. Long). 
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He was negligent in failing to include PE in his differential diagnosis based on Mrs. 
Aguilar's signs and symptoms during the last two weeks of May 2003 and in failing to 
connect those signs and symptoms with those she had previously exhibited. His 
negligence was a substantial factor in the ultimate death of Mrs. Aguilar. He was 
particularly negligent after her negative cardiac work-up by Drs. Chai and Field and should 
have immediately focused on a pulmonary cause for her condition and ordered the PE 
screening tests. Dr . .Blaylock, as set forth above, will supplement his opinions once he has 
been' afforded the opportunity to review the deposition testimony of Dr. Coonrod. 
Concerning Dr. Newman, Dr. Blaylock is of the opinion, to a reasonable me:dical 
probability, that Dr. Newman's care and treatment of Maria Aguilar on May 31, 2003, 
violated the standard of care for a family medicine physician acting as an emergency 
medicine physician in Caldwell, Idaho, on that date. Dr. Newman's failure to r~nder 
appropriate medical care to Mrs. Aguilar was a substantial factor in her death. 
. At the time he saw and examined Mrs. Aguilar, Dr. Newman knew or should have 
known that she had suffered an unexplained syncopal episode accompanied by dizziness, 
heart palpitations and shortness of breath. He knew or should have known that Mrs. 
Aguilar had undergone a left heart catheterization on May 29,2003 which was normal. He 
knew or should have known that Mrs. Aguilar had a history of pleuritic chest pain. He knew 
or should have known that she had a history of anemia but that her most recent hematocrit 
level had been within normal limits. Dr. Newman's diagnosis of "syncope and anemia" is 
not supported by either his examination of Mrs. Aguilar or her most recent test results. To 
diagnose anemia without ordering any blood testing to confirm such a diagnosis is below 
the standard of care and leaves the diagnosis unsupported. 
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Based upon Dr. Newman's own chart notes of May 31, 2003, he obtained a history 
from Mrs. Aguilar, her family and the EMS personnel who transported her to the hospital. 
Therefore, he is charged with the knowledge that the EMS personnel had noted that Mrs. 
Aguilar was suffering from shortness of breath en route to the hospital. Dr. Newman failed 
to take into account the fact that Mrs. Aguilar's heart rate was elevated and failed to 
investigate the totality of her symptoms and history in arriving at a diagnosis and treatment 
plan. PE should have been in his differential diagnosis and ruled out. 
. Dr. Newman's chart notes indicate a failure to form a differential diagnosis which 
should have included the probability that Mrs. Aguilar was suffering from pulmonary emboli 
on May 31, 2003. Had Dr. Newman performed a proper examination, obtained an 
appropriate history and reviewed/considered her previouswork-ups over the last 5 days, as 
the standard of care required him to do, his differential diagnosis should have incl\Jded 
pulmonary embolus. At that point, Dr. Newman should have immediately either ordered a 
D-Dimer, chest CT scan or vIa scan, followed by a pulmonary angiogram and/or blood 
clotting studies, if they were abnormal. Anyone of these tests would have shown, more 
probably than not, that Mrs. Aguilar's true condition was a result of pulmonary emboli. Had 
he performed his obligations in accordance with the standard of health care practice 
applicable to him, Dr. Newman would have and could have taken steps which would have, 
more probably than not, saved Mrs. Aguilar's life. 
Dr. Newman's diagnostic considerations of: MI, arrhythmia, dehydration and anemia 
are not reasonable by either his examination or the patient's history. The fact he failed to 
include pulmonary embolus in his diagnostic considerations is a violation of the standard of 
health care under these circumstances. There is no indication Mrs. Aguilar was suffering 
from an irregular heartbeat, was dehydrated or anemic. Her week long progressive ~igns 
" 
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and symptoms strongly indicated either a cardiac or pulmonary problem and cardiac had 
already been ruled out. Nevertheless, he failed to take the necessary and appropriate 
steps to investigate pulmonary embolus by simple, routine screening tests. 
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D. Witness's credentials. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the curriculum vitae of Or. Blaylock and the cases 
in which he has been involved during the last four years. Or. Blaylock's fee schedule is as 
follows: File review; $240.00 per hour; Deposition; $500.00 per hour; trial testimony; 
$650.00 per hour. He also charges out-of-pocket expenses and trial and deposition 
cancellation charges based on length of notice of cancellation. He has a minimum c~arge 
of $1,500.00 for deposition and $3,900.00 for trial testimony per day. 
2. Samuel LeBaron, M.D., Ph.D. 
Center for Education in Family and Community Medicine 
Stanford School of Medicine 
1215 Welch Road, Modular G 
Palo Alto, CA 94305 
A. Subject matter of expected testimony. 
Dr. LeBaron, who is a board certified family medicine specialist and a Professor of 
Family Medicine at Stanford School of Medicine, is expected to testify regarding the 
applicable standard of health care practice as to the work-up and diagnosis of pulmonary 
emboli. Dr. LeBaron's main focus will be on the activities of Defendant Coonrod and that 
disclosure must await the deposition testimony of Or. Coonrod. However, Or. LeBaron also 
has opinions regarding the activities of Or. Newman, also a board certified family 
practitioner. 
He will testify and comment on the testimony of Defendants and their disclosed 
experts witnesses. Dr. LeBaron may also testify based upon any medical literature which 
he deems appropriate to support or substantiate his testimony. He may employ illustrative 
aids in rendering testimony. If and when such medical literature ahd illustrative aids are 
identified, this disclosure will be supplemented. 
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8. Substance of Facts. 
Dr. LeBaron has reviewed the medical records of Maria A. Aguilar generated by 
Primary Health, Dr. Coonrod, Mercy Medical Center, West Valley Regional Medical Center, 
Canyon County Paramedics, Boise Gastroenterology Associates, St. Alphonsus RMC, 
Canyon County Coroner, Pennywise Drug, Robin King, D.C. and the Death Certificate. Dr. 
LeBaron has also reviewed the deposition of Defendants taken thus far and the 
depositions of the Plaintiffs. It is expected that Dr. LeBaron will also review depositions 
taken in the future of various experts and/or treating health care providers .. 
Dr. LeBaron will testify as to his understanding of the facts of this case based upon 
his review of the above-referenced documents and depositions. 
At an appropriate time in the near future, once Dr. Coonrod's deposition has been 
secured, Dr. LeBaron will speak to a family medicine physician in the Caldwell, Idaho area 
to discuss the local, community standard of care applicable to Dr. Coonrod and Dr. 
Newman in April, May and June of 2003. When that is accomplished, this disclosure will 
be supplemented. 
C. Substance of opinions. 
The opinions set forth below are based upon the medical records and Dr. LeBaron's 
background, training, education and experience. The opinions expressed by Dr. LeBaron 
herein are opinions he holds to a reasonable medical certainty or probability. 
Working under a hypothetical situation in which we posit that Dr. Newman was not 
functioning as an emergency physician in the ED at West Valley RMC on May 31,2003, 
but was instead functioning as a family medicine physician in a non-emergent setting; his 
activities in providing medical care and treatment to Maria Aguilar on that date would still 
have constituted a violation of the standard of care for a board certified family medicine 
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physician in Caldwell, Idaho. 
The signs and symptoms which Mrs. Aguilar exhibited while in the ED and those 
symptoms as reported by the EMS personnel mandated an investigation that should have 
included a work-up for pulmonary embolus. Regardless of the consultants, facilities or 
equipment available to Dr. Newman, he failed to engage in an appropriate thought process 
to determine the cause of the patient's symptoms. This work-up should have included 
some combination of D-Dimer, chest CT, V/Q scan, blood clotting studies and/or a 
pulmonary angiogram. On May 31, 2003, a thoughtful review of the patient's history and 
symptoms in addition to conducting at least a D-Dimer would, more probably than not, 
have indicated that Mrs. Aguilar was experiencing pulmonary emboli or a pulmonary 
embolus. 
Her symptoms included a history of dizziness, weakness, shortness of breath 
preceding a syncopal episode, a history of chest pain, and a history of a recent negative 
left heart catheterization. She also had a history of easy fatigue. Her vital signs and 
testing while in the ED did not support a diagnosis of myocardial infarction, arrhythmia, 
dehydration or anemia. Dr. Newman failed to perform any testing or examination to 
support his diagnostic considerations. His failure to consider a pulmonary etiology for Mrs. 
Aguilar's symptoms is consistent with his failure to explore that possibility in undertaking 
any investigation of the pulmonary system. There is nothing in his chart from that day or in 
his deposition testimony which evidences a critical thinking pathway appropriate for a 
family medicine physician under these or aOny other circumstances. Even though he noted 
the presence of ~bnormal EKG findings, he did not adequately consider and investigate the 
etiology for those findings. Had he done so, he could have arrived at the conclusion that a 
possible etiology was pulmonary embolus. The consideration of that possibility should 
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have led him to undertake a specific investigation to rule out a pulmonary embolus. The 
information to make such a diagnosis was available to Dr. Newman but he failed to form a 
differential diagnosis and further failed to take any steps to rule in or rule out pulmonary 
embolus. This was a violation of the standard of care for a family medicine physician 
under any circumstances, regardless of the clinical setting. This failure by Dr. Newman 
was unfortunately a sUbstantial factor in Mrs. Aguilar's death. Had Dr. Newman performed 
in accordance with the standard of care applicable to him on May 31,2003 in Caldwell, 
Idaho, Mrs. Aguilar would most likely have received life saving treatment. 
While Dr. LeBaron is of the opinion that Dr. Newman is to be held to the standard of 
care applicable to an emergency physician in which role he was functioning at the time, his 
actions are also below the standard of care applicable to a family medicine physician under 
any clinical circumstances. 
D. Witness's credentials. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of Dr. LeBaron's curriculum vitae and prior 
trial testimony. Dr. LeBaron's fee schedule is as follows: File review; $50.00 per hour; 
Deposition; $600.00 per hour; trial testimony; depends on time and amount of travel, but 
this would be consistent with other experts involved in the case. 
3. Dean Lapinel, M.D. 
1437 E. Braemere Road 
Boise, 10 83702 
Dr. Lapinel is a board certified emergency medicine physician who now engages in 
medical research and primary medical care, having semi-retired from the practice of 
emergency medicine in 2001. 
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A. Subject matter of expected testimony. 
It is expected that Dr. Lapinel will offer testimony to educate the jury regarding 
medical issues involved in this litigation. It is expected that he will testify and comment on 
the testimony of Defendants and their disclosed experts witnesses. Dr. Lapinel may also 
testify based upon any medical literature which he deems appropriate to support or 
sUbstantiate his testimony. He may employ illustrative aids in rendering testimony. If and 
when such medical literature and illustrative aids are identified, this disclosure will be 
supplemented. 
B. Substance of Facts. 
Dr. Lapinel has reviewed the medical records of Maria A. Aguilar generated by 
Primary Health, Dr. Coonrod, Mercy Medical Center, West Valley Regional Medical Center, 
Canyon County Paramedics, Boise Gastroenterology Associates, St. Alphonsus RMC, 
Canyon County Coroner, Pennywise Drug, Robin King, D.C. and the Death Certificate. In 
addition, he has reviewed the depositions of Defendants Newman, Long and Chai. 
It is expected that Dr. Lapinel will also review depositions taken in the future of 
various experts and/or treating health care providers. He is also expected to review other 
literature and materials regarding the subject matter of this litigation. 
Dr. Lapinel will testify as to his understanding as to the facts of this case based 
upon his review of the above-referenced documents and depositions. 
C. Substance of Opinions. 
The opinions expressed by Dr. Lapinel are based upon his training, education, 
background and experience and are opinions which he holds to a reasonable medical 
certainty or probability. These opinions are necessarily preliminary as the deposition 
testimony of Dr. Coonrod has yet to be taken and Dr. Coonrod's testimony may impact the 
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opinions to which Dr. Lapine/ will testify. 
1. Dr. Long 
With regard to the activities of Defendant Long in providing medical care and 
treatment for Maria Aguilar on May 27, 2003; it is Dr. Lapine/'s opinion that Dr. Long 
violated the standard of health care practice applicable to him as an emergency physician 
on that date in Nampa, Idaho. Whether or not Dr. Long had in his possession the. EKG 
and chest x-ray taken at Primary Health by Dr. Coonrod on that date and regardle~s of 
whether or not Dr. Long either spoke by telephone with Dr. Coonrod or was informed of Dr. 
Coonrod's call to the emergency department at MMC; Dr. Long had in his possession 
sufficient medical information to require him to order a. chest CT and a pulmonary 
angiogram. Coupled with the examination finding of sharp, continuous chest pain 
exacerbated by deep breathing, it was a violation of the applicable standard of care fpr Dr. 
Long to discharge this patient without first obtaining and reviewing those studies. Had Dr. 
Long done so, the pulmonary angiogram would have, to a reasonable medical cert~inty, 
shown evidence of pulmonary emboli. Effective treatment could and would have then been 
initiated and it would have, more probably than not, been effective in preventing Mrs. 
Aguilar's death. Dr. Long's failure in this regard was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the death of Mrs. Aguilar. 
The EKG taken at Primary Health by order of Dr. Coonrod indicated an 81 03 T3 
pattern which is suggestive of right heart strain which would call for a differential diagnosis 
including a cardiac or pulmonary etiology for the EKG findings. The EKG performed that 
same date by order of Dr. Long at Mercy Medical Center is even more suggestive o'f right 
heart strain than the previous EKG and called for a thought process by an ED physician 
such as Dr. Long which should have included pulmonary emboli as a causative agent. In 
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order to comport with the standard of care for an emergency physician on May 27, 2003 in 
Nampa, Idaho, Dr. Long would have been under an obligation to pursue this diagnosis with 
appropriate testing and radiological studies prior to discharging the patient. His failur,es in 
these regards were a violation of the applicable standard of care. 
The clinical impression of Dr. Long that Mrs. Aguilar was suffering from atypical 
chest pain and GERD is not consistent with the EKG findings of May 27,2003 and indicate 
Dr. Long did not appreciate the significance of those findings. To discharge the patient 
with a clinical impression of GERD was a violation of the standard of care. Dr. Long 
missed the most probable diagnosis of pulmonary etiology and chose instead a much less 
likely diagnosis of GERD. Dr. Long then released the patient with a script for Darvocet, a 
pain medication which has a tendency to worsen the symptoms of GERD. 
2. Dr. Newman 
Dr. Newman saw and examined Mrs. Aguilar at VVVMC on May 31,2003. At that 
point in time, Dr. Newman knew by history that Mrs. Aguilar had undergone a left heart 
catheterization on May 29, 2003, which was negative for any heart etiology for the chest 
pain she described. He knew she had experienced heart palpitations and felt weak before 
the syncopal episode for which she was transported to the ED by paramedics. He also 
knew from his examination that she had been suffering from chest pain in the recent past. 
Chest pain is atypical for anemia and Dr. Newman should have known this and taken it into 
account. He also either knew or should have known that she complained of dizziness, 
weakness and shortness of breath prior to the syncopal episode as reported by the EMS 
personnel. Since Dr. Newman listed EMS as one of the historians and since the EMS 
personnel relayed this information to the ED at VVVMC, Dr. Newman is charged with this 
knowledge because the standard of care applicable to him in Caldwell, Idaho on May 31, 
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2003, required him to apprise himself of all relevant medical information pertaining to the 
patient's chief complaint. While noting that Mrs. Aguilar's heart rate is elevated, he does 
nothing to determine the reason for the tachycardia; another violation of the standard of 
care. 
Next, without first ordering an hematocrit, Dr. Newman forms a clinical impression of 
syncope and anemia. However, her last hematocrit on May 29,2003, had been 37A; 
within the normal range. Since her hematocrit on June 4, 2003 was 41.8, once ~gain, 
normal; had Dr. Newman ordered an hematocrit on May 31, 2003, it would more probably 
than not been normal, ruling out a diagnosis of anemia. Thus Dr. Newman's clinical 
impression is unsupported by the medical record, another violation of the standard of care. 
Had Dr. Newman actually believed Mrs. Aguilar was suffering from anemia, it was his 
obligation to order an hematocrit, perform a rectal examination to determine if there. was 
blood in the stool and place a NG tube to determine if their was bleeding from the GI tract. 
He did none of these things; another violation of the standard of care under the 
circumstances. 
Had Dr. Newman engaged in a critical thinking pathway, he would have and should 
have arrived at a differential diagnosis which placed pulmonary embolus as the most likely 
etiology for her syncopal episode. The failure to do this was a violation of the standard of 
care and a substantial factor leading to Mrs. Aguilar's death. Had he acted appropriately, 
effective treatment could have been initiated which would, more probably than not, have 
saved Mrs. Aguilar's fife. 
. Dr. Newman's diagnostic considerations were: myocardial infarction, arrhythmia, 
dehydration and anemia. Mrs. Aguilar's heart did not show an irregular pattern and her 
Troponin I level was within the normal range. She showed no signs of dehydration as 
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evidenced by her orthostatic vital signs. In short, Dr. Newman's diagnostic considerations 
are unsu~ported and he left un investigated the most probable diagnosis, pulmonary 
, -
embolus. ; The EKG of May 31-, 2003 indicates that her pattern had become '!lore 
pronounced, with a longer 81, more prominentQ3 and 10ngerT-wave than evidenced on 
May 27, 4003. This pattern is even more indicative of right heart strain and yet Dr. 
Newman f~ils to take this into account, writing "normal exam, negative heart, pulmonary." 
With an EKG indicative of right heart strain, an emergency physician, in order to comply 
with the applicable standard of care, would have been obligated to include pulmonary 
embolus irjJ the differential diagnosis and order appropriate testing and radiological scans to 
either rule; it in or rule it out. The failure to do this was, once again, a violation of the 
standard ~f care for Dr. Newman. Once again, these failures by Dr. Newman were a 
substanti~1 factor in Mrs. Aguilar's death because more probably than not, had a pulmonary 
CT or pulmonary angiogram been performed, as required by the standard of care, a 
diagnosis ,of PE would have been made. 
D. Witness's credentials. 
Att~ched hereto as Exhibit "c" is Dr. Lapinel's curriculum vitae. He charges $250.00 
! . 
per hour. Dr. Lapinel has never testified as a witness in any civil case. 
4. Richard Lubman, M.D. 
Associate Professor of Medicine, Physiology and Biophysics 
USC Keck School of Medicine 
2011 Zonal Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0903 
A. Subiect matter of expected testimony. 
Dr. Lubman is expected to testify regarding the specific treatment alternatives which 
could have been employed by Mrs. Aguilar's treating physicians had they made a 
differential diagnosis which included pulmonary emboli. It is expected that Dr. Lubman will 
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testify regarding the relative effectiveness of those various treatment alternatives at various 
points in the treatment of Mrs. Aguilar beginning in the latter part of April 2003, up until the 
, 
date of h~r death on June 4, 2003. In conjunction with his opinions regarding the 
! 
i 
effectiven~ss of anticoagulant therapy, Dr. Lubman will explain the pathophysiology of how 
, 
i 
and why s~ch treatments act to correct and prevent the development and continuation of 
pulmonarY: emboli. 
! 
Dr. :Lubman will testify and comment on the testimony of Defendants and their 
, 
disclosed !experts witnesses. Dr. Lubman may also testify based upon any medical 
\ 
literature thich he deems appropriate to support or SUbstantiate his testimony. He may 
employ iII~strative aids in rendering testimony. If and when such medical literature and 
i 
illustrativeiaids are identified, this disclosure will be supplemented. 
B. Substance of Facts. 
Dr. ILubman has reviewed the medical records of Maria A. Aguilar generate.d by 
Primary H~alth, Mercy Medical Center, West Valley Regional Medical Center, Canyon 
I 
County P~ramedics, St. Alphonsus RMC and the Autopsy Report. In addition, he has 
, 
reviewed the depositions of Defendants Newman, Long and Chai. 
It is' expected that Dr. Lubman will also review depositions taken in the future of 
various experts and/or treating health care providers. He is also expected to review other 
literature ~nd materials regarding the subject matter of this litigation. 
l 
Dr. tubman will testify as to his understanding as to the facts of this case based 
upon his r~view of the above-referenced documents and depositions. 
C. Substance of Opinions. 
Th~ opinions set forth below are based upon Dr. Lubman's review of the above-
reference4 materials; his background, education, training and experience. The opinions 
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expressed by Dr. Lubman herein are opinions he holds to a reasonable medical certainty 
or probability. Dr. Lubman does not intend to offer standard of care opinions nor does he 
intend to offer opinions regarding at what points in time pulmonary embolus could or 
should have been diagnosed. Questions of that nature are beyond the scope of his 
involvement in this matter. 
In Dr. Lubman's opinion, at any point in time up until her arrest on June, 4, 2003, 
Mrs. Aguilar could have been effectively treated with heparin in a hospital based s~tting 
with a switch to long term coumadin (warfarin) therapy upon discharge. He will testify that 
if it had been discovered that she was showering pulmonary emboli, one alternative w,ould 
have been to i~plant a filter into the inferior vena cava. 
While from the medical records Dr. Lubman does not find evidence of hemodynamic 
instability, had such an assessment been made, thrombolytic agents such as streptokinase 
tPA (tissue plasminogen activator) could have been employed. 
. Dr. Lubman will also explain the pathophysiology of the cardiovascular and 
pulmonary system and explain why, in his opinion, the cardiac catheterization which Mrs. 
Aguilar underwent on May 29,2003, is unlikely to have had a causal relationship to her 
cause of death. Whereas it is conceivable that an individual might develop deep venous 
thrombosis during a performance of a coronary angiogram and left ventriculogram, the 
nature of the procedure predisposes toward arterial thrombosis rather than venous 
thrombosis. A cardiac catheter is threaded into an artery rather than a vein in the cpurse 
of this procedure, thus causing the local vascular injury that can, on rare occasions, result 
in significant clot formation. When they occur, these clots do not dislodge and travel to the 
pulmonary circulation as do those from the venous circulation. Rather, they may lodge 
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distally in the arterial circulation, causing locally inadequate blood flow (ischemia) and 
potentially, loss of a limb. This did not happen in the case of Mrs. Aguilar. 
D. Witness's credentials. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a copy of Dr. Lubman's curriculum vitae. His fee 
schedule is as follows: record review and consultation; $300.00 per hour; deposition 
testimony; $400.00; trial testimony; $1,500.00 for half day pIlls expenses. Dr. Lubman has 
not testified in any cases in the last four years. 
5. Cornelius Hofman 
The GEC Group 
MBA Economics and Finance 
University of Chicago 
A. Subject matter of expected testimony. 
Mr. Hofman is expected to testify concerning the economic losses to the 
Plaintiffs. 
B. Substance of facts. 
See Mr. Hofman's report, attached hereto as Exhibit liE." 
C. Substance of opinions. 
See Mr. Hofman's report, attached hereto as Exhibit liE." 
D. Witness's credentials. 
See the curriculum vitae of Cornelius Hofman, his fee schedule and a list of 
previous cases in which he has testified, attached hereto as Exhibit "F." 
6. Loss Counselor 
Plaintiffs also intend to offer testimony by an individual qualified to interview 
Plaintiffs and give opinions related to the effects Maria A. Aguilar's death had on various 
Plaintiffs. This individual will be a psychologisVcounselor and it is expected that, especially 
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with regard to Plaintiffs Alejandro and Lorena Aguilar, this individual will testify as to how 
the loss of their mother has and will effect their future development. It is anticipateq. that 
this individual will also interview all of the Plaintiffs and formulate opinions regarding how 
the loss of Maria has affected each Plaintiff and the family as a whole. 
At present, Plaintiffs are attempting to identify such an individual and schedule a 
session or sessions whereby this individual can gather the necessary data and inforO)ation 
to formulate such opinions. Plaintiffs are making every effort to expedite this process in 
order to give Defendants ample opportunity to conduct discovery on this subject area. 
At such time as this individual is identified and completed his/her work,. this 
disclosure will be supplemented. 
CAVEAT 
It should be understood that Plaintiffs have made a good faith effort to set forth the 
substance of the opinions to which the above-named treating health care providers and 
experts will testify. However, it is impossible to specifically setforth every opinion these 
individuals will express and the exact manner in which those opinions will be expressed. 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to elicit from the above-named health care providers / experts, 
additional testimony and opinions from those individuals based upon information 
subsequently produced, information gleaned during depositions of Defendants' experts and 
any subsequent opinions or information developed by the above-named individuals from 
other sources. As it is anticipated that the Defendants will obtain the deposition testimony 
of the above-named health care providers / experts, this expert disclosure should not be 
assumed to be all inclusive in nature. Plaintiffs also reserve the right to amend, mOdify, 
delete from or add to by supplementation, this disclosure as further information is 
developed through discovery. Plaintiffs also reserve the right to name and call as expert 
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witnesses any individuals identified by any party as expert witnesses and also reserves the 
right to obtain medical testimony from any other health care provider named or identified 
during the discovery process. 
DATED THIS..iS:... day of January, 2008. 
B~tnA-
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .J..L day of January, 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Andrew C. Brassey, Esq. 
Brassey Wetherell Crawford & 
McCurdy LLP 
203 W. Main St. 
." Boise, ID 83702 
Joseph D. McCollum, Jr. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 W. Main St., Ste. 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, 10 83701-1617 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello ID 83204-0817 
James B. Lynch 
Lynch & Associates, PLLC 
1412 W. Idaho Street, Suite 200 
PO Box 739 
Boise, JD 83701-0739 
o U.S. Mail ~ Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile (208) 344-7077 
o U.S. Mail ~ Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile (208) 342-3829 
o U.S. Mail 
o "Hand Delivery ~ Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
o U.S. Mail 
[]/ Hand Delivery 
o Facsimire (208) 331-0088 
Byro:: . ~~;;1\== 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DANIEL WEBSTER and CHERl WEBSTER, 






















CHRlSTIAN ZIMMERMAN, MD; BOISE 
ANESTHESIA, P A; WILLIAM BINEGAR, 
MD; and SCOTT WESTERLUND, CRNA, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV PI 0100275D 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR COSTS 
This matter came before the Court on the Defenda:nts' motions for costs and the Plaintiffs' 
,. 
motion to disallow costs. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on March 13, 2006 and 
took the matter fully under advisement at that time. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case stems from an operation that Defendant Christian Zimmerman, M.D. perfonned on 
Plaintiff Daniel Webster's cervical spine on May 28, 1999. Mr. Webster had consulted with Dr. 
Zimmennan, complaining of tingling sensations in his extremities. Dr. Zimmerman evaluated Mr. 
Webster and concluded that Mr. Webster's condition necessitated surgery. The next day, Dr. 
Zimmerman perfonned an anterior cervical disckectomy on Mr. Webster's spine. Upon the 
conclusion of the surgery, it was discovered that Mr. Webster had partially tost spinal function below 
the site of the surgery. 
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Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Defendants William Binegar, M.D. and Scott 
Westerlund, C.N.R.A. (the Anesthesia Defendants), the he~lth care providers who administered the 
anesthesia to Mr. Webster during his surgery. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Binegar and Mr. Westerlund 
breached the local standard of health care providers in administering the anesthesia to Mr. Webster 
by using a direct visual intubation rather than an awake fiber optic intubation. Plaintiffs also alleged 
that Dr. Zimmerman breached the local standard of health care providers by failing to adequately 
advise and supervise the anesthesia team in regard to the, proper intubation technique that should 
have been used on Mr. Webster. 
The jury trial in this case commenced on November 11, 2005 and last approximately six 
weeks. Nineteen witnesses testified on the Plaintiffs behalf, and sixteen witnesses testified on the 
Defendants behalf. On December 14,2005, the twenty-second day of trial, the case was submitted to 
the jury. Approximately two hours after the case was submitted, the jury returned with a unanimous 
verdict in favor of the Defendants. 
II. ANESTHESIA DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S4(d)(1)(A) states that a prevailing party shall be awarded 
costs, unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the rules of civil procedure. "The 
determination of which party is the prevailing party for purpose of awarding costs is within the 
discretion of the trial court." J.R. Simp/ot Co. w: Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 
] 96, 198 (1999). Having considered the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54( d)(l )(B), the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants were prevailing parties in this trial. 



























A. Costs as a Matter ofiRight 
Certain costs are to be awarded to a prevailing party as a matter of right. LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C). 
Having considered the objections and responses made by t)1e parties, the Court finds that the costs 
prayed for by the Anesthesia Defendants pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(C) were 
reasonably incurred. The Court finds, therefore, that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the 
$17,091.67 ih costs prayed for as a matter of right. 
B. Discretionary Costs 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)(D) authorizes the awarding of discretionary costs to a 
prevailing party. The decision of whether to award discretionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)(D) is left to the discretion of the trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 
Idaho 681, 689, 39 P.3d 621, 629 (2001). When an objecti~n to discretionary costs is presented, the 
trial court "shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or 
should not be allowed." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Thus, the Court must make specific findings that each 
discretionary cost was 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should be assessed 
against the adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432, 18 P.3d 227, 
237 (Ct. App. 2001); Swallow v. Emergency Med o/Idaho, PA, 138 Idaho 539, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). 
Plaintiffs argue that the Anesthesia Defendants' unverified memorandum in support of their 
motion for discretionary costs should be stricken because it was unverified and untimely. See Camp 
v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,883,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding "that failure to verify 
a memorandum of costs, including attorney fees, reriders it subject to timely objection but does not 
render it jurisdictionally defective"). The Court finds that although Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54( d)(5) requires the moving party to verify its memorandum of costs, it does not specify that 
supporting memoranda also need be verified. Because there is no contention that the Anesthesia 



























Defendants' memorandum of costs was not verified, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs' motion to 
disallow the supporting memorandum. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
1. Court Reporter Fees 
The Court finds that the costs incurred in acquiring the transcripts of certain witness 
testimony were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. In 
the interests of justice, the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the $5,037.69 
prayed for. 
2. Additional Expert Witness Fees 
The Court finds that the costs incurred in employing the services of certain expert witnesses, 
beyond those costs awarded as a matter of right, were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given 
the magnitude and nature of the trial. The Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants have complied 
with the documentation requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5), which requires only 
that the memorandum of costs verify "that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items 
are correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. " The Court finds further that 
any objection that witness testimony was duplicative should have been made at trial. In the interests 
of justice, the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the $38,494.14 prayed for. 
3. Independent Medical Examination 
The Court fmds that the costs associated with the completion of an independent medical 
examination were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. 
In the interests of justice, the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the $8,462.63 
prayed for. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR COSTS - Page 4 
• " "t 
i 
.. "..-' 
4. Investigation Concerning Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses 
2 
The Court finds that the costs associated with the investigation of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses 
3 were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. In the 
4 interests of justice, the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the $2,440.54 
5 prayed for. 
6 5. Medical Records Retrieval 
7 
The Court finds that the costs associated with the retrieval and reproduction of certain 
8 
medical images were necessary, exceptional, and reasonabJe given the magnitude and nature of the 
9 
10 
trial. In the interests of justice, the Court fmds that the Anesthesia Defendants are entitled to the 
11 $786.20 prayed for. 
12 6. Medical Textbooks 
13 The Court finds that the costs associated with the purchase of medical textbooks relied upon 
14 by Plaintiffs' expert witnesses were necessary. exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and 
15 
nature of the trial. In the interests of justice. the Court finds that the Anesthesia Defendants are 
16 
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III. DR. ZIMMERMAN'S MOTION FOR COSTS 
Having considered the factors set forth in Idaho ~ule of Civil Procedure S4(d)(1)(B), the 
Court finds that defendant Dr. Zimmennan was a prevailing! party in this trial. 
A. Costs as a Matter of; Right 
Certain costs are to be awarded to a prevailing party'as a matter of right. LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). 
Having considered the objections and responses made by the parties, the Court finds that the costs 
prayed for by Dr. Zimmennan pursuant to Idaho Rul~ of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(C) were 
reasonably incurred. The Court fmds, therefore, that Dr. Ziinmennan is entitled to the $11,191.46 in 
costs prayed for as a matter of right. 
B. Discretionary Costs 
i 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(D) authorizes the awarding of discretionary costs to a 
prevailing party. The decision of whether to award discr¢tionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(D) is left to the discretion of the trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 
Idaho 681,689,39 P.3d 621, 629 (2001). When an objection to discretionary costs is presented, the 
trial court "shall make express fmdings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or 
should not be allowed." LR.C.P. S4(d)(1)(D). Thus, the Co~ must make specific fmdings that each 
discretionary cost was 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should be assessed 
against the adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v; State, 135 Idaho 422, 432, 18 PJd 227, 
237 (Ct. App. 2001); Swallow v. Emergency Med ofldaho,PA, 138 Idaho 539,67 PJd 68 (2003). 
Plaintiffs argue that the Dr. Zimmennan's unvenfied memorandum in support of their 
motion for discretionary costs should be stricken because it was unverified and untimely. See Camp 
v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,883,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding "that failure to verify 
a memorandum of costs, including attorney fees, renders it subject to timely objection but does not 
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render it jurisdictionally defective"). The question is whethe;~ the objection to the lack of verification 
was timely. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' February 13, 20D6 objection came after Dr. Zimmerman 
submitted a verified version of his memorandum of costsi on January 4, 2006. Consequently, the 
verified memorandum was timely filed. 
1. Hearing and Trial Transcipts 
The Court finds that the costs incurred in acquiring the transcripts of certain witness 
testimony were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable givem the magnitude and nature of the trial. In 
the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. Zimmerman is entitled to the $6,191.25 prayed for. 
2. Additionai Expert Witness Fees 
The Court finds that the costs incurred in employing the services of certain e;xpert witnesses, 
beyond those costs awarded as a matter of right, were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given 
the magnitude and nature of the trial. The Court finds that any objection that witness testimony was 
duplicative should have been made at trial. In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. 
Zimmerman is entitled to the $45,462.36 prayed for. 
3. Plaintiff's Attendance at Independen~ Medical Examination 
The Court finds that the costs associated with the completion of an independent medical 
examination were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable giiVen the magnitude and nature of the trial. 
In the interests of justice, the Court fmds that Dr. Zimmerman is entitled to the $4 I 5.86 prayed for. 
4. Preparation of DVD of lME 
The Court finds that the costs associated with the preparation of Exhibit 271 (a-2) , the DVD 
of the 1ME, were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable giYen the magnitude and nature of the trial. 
In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. Zimmerman is entitled to the $958.00 prayed for. 
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5. Medical Records Retrieval 
The Court finds that the costs associated with th~ retrieval and reproduction of certain 
medical records were necessary, exceptional, and reasonabLe given the magnitude and nature of the 
trial. In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. ~immerman is entitled to the $2,189.43 
prayed for. 
6. Medical Imagin~ 
The Court finds that the costs associated with ~e retrieval and reproduction of certain 
medical images were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the 
trial. In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. Zimmerman is entitled to the $4,999.50 
prayed for. 
7. Travel for Attendance at ~eposition 
The Court finds that the costs associated with attending out-of-town depositions were 
necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. Plaintiffs do not 
object. In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr; Zimmerman is entitled to the $676.25 
prayed for. 
8. Independent Medical Examination 
The Court fmds that the costs associated with the completion of an independent medical 
examination were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. 
In the interests of justice, the Court finds that Dr. Zimmerinan is entitled to the $2,053.00 prayed for. 
9. Videographcr for lME 
. The Court fmds that the costs associated with the videotaping of an independent medical 
examination were necessary, exceptional, and reasonable given the magnitude and nature of the trial. 
In the interests ofjustice, the Court finds that Dr. Zimmerman is entitled to the $147.06 prayed for. 
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C. Real Parties in Interest 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs, and not the bankruptcy trustee, are the real party in interest in 
this case. Plaintiff had gone through bankruptcy and were discharged on June 16, 2003. The Court 
finds that the automatic bankruptcy stay is lifted once a party is discharged out of bankruptcy. See 11 
U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). 
D. Conclusion 
Dr. Zimmerman's motion for costs is hereby granted, entitling him to a total of $73,735.09. 
This figure represents $11,191.46 in costs as a matter ofri~t and $62,543.63 in discretionary costs. 
The Court calculated the total amount of discretionary costs based on the itemized figures provided 
in Dr. Zimmerman's memorandum of costs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the Court's findings above, Defendants' motions for costs are hereby granted 
and Plaintiffs' motion to disallow those costs is hereby deni:ed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ;( ?r;;;; of April, 2006. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health Care Center (collectively, 
"Coonrod") have moved this Court to alter or amend the Judgment entered in this case, 
arguing that the five Plaintiffs in this case are but a single Plaintiff for purposes of the 
statutory damage cap found in Idaho Code § 6-1603. Coonrod's position that the various 
individual party Plaintiffs are limited to and must divide the single statutory cap amount is 
without merit because: (1) it is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 6-1603, and 
specifically ignores J. C. § 6-1603(2)'s unambiguous definition of "claimant"; (2) fails to take 
into account the Idaho Supreme Court's authoritative decision in Homerv. Sani-Top, 143 
Idaho 230, 141 P.2d 1099 (2006), as well as three relevant Idaho District Court decisions; 
and (3) Coonrod's interpretation of the statutory damage cap would produce a result that 
violates the Idaho Constitution's equal protection and special legislation provisions. Given 
that the statute may be constitutionally construed in favor of the Plaintiffs, this Court should 
avoid the necessity of any unconstitutional construction. 
ARGUMENT 
1. I.C. § 6-1603's Plain Language Establishes that it Applies Per Claimant. 
In order to resolve whether I.C. § 6-1603's cap on non-economic damages is to be 
applied per "claim" or per "claimant," it is necessary to start with the statute's plain 
language. It is well established that courts must interpret statutes according to the plain, 
express meaning of the provision in question and will not resort to judicial construction 
unless the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other 
laws. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732,742,979 P.2d 605, 615 
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(1999). Prior to its amendment effective in July 2003, and as applicable to this case, I.C. § 
6-1603 states in relevant part: 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, 
shall a judgment for non-economic damages be entered for a claimant 
exceeding the maximum amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars 
($250,000); provided, however, that beginning on July 1,2004, and each July 
1, 2004, and each July 1 thereafter, the cap on non-economic damages 
established in this section shall increase or decrease in accordance with the 
percentage amount of increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial 
commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to 
section 72-409(2), Idaho Code. 
(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of (a) non-
economic damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal injury or 
who is asserting a wrongful death; non-economic damages sustained by a 
claimant, regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages 
or the number of actions filed. 1 
Critically, the Legislature specifically defined the term "claimant, as "mean[ing] any party to 
a civil action making a claim for relief, legal or equitable, compensatory or 
noncompensatory." I.C. § 6-1601(2) (emphasis added). 
In this case, each of the Aguilar Plaintiffs is a party Plaintiff to this civil action and 
each made a claim for relief seeking compensatory damages. Thus, each of the Plaintiffs 
is a "claimant" as that term is defined in I.C. § 6-1601(2). 
I. C. § 6-1603 prohibits the Court from entering a non-economic damages judgment 
in favor of a "claimant" in an amount that exceeds the amount of the cap. In essence, the 
statute requires a court to examine the non-economic damages awarded by a jury to each 
plaintiff/claimant, determine if the jury's award to that plaintiff/claimant exceeds the 
1 The Idaho legislature amended I.e. § 6-1603 in 2003, reducing the base amount of the cap to 
$250,000. That cap, however, specifically applied to causes of action which accrued after July 1, 
2003 and is thus not applicable here. 
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statutory cap, and then reduce the award if the jury's verdict to any particular plaintiff 
exceeds the statutory cap. It is clear from the plain language of the statute that this is done 
on a "per claimant" basis. 
While it is not necessary to go beyond the statute's plain language, I.C. § 6-1603's 
legislative history supports the "per claimant" analysis. As noted, the statute was amended 
in 2003 to reduce the cap to $250,000. In the. Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee, 
Kenneth R. McClure, a Boise attorney and a founder of the state's principal tort "reform" 
group, The Idaho Liability Reform Coalition, testified in support of the amendment, stating: 
The limitation on non-economic damages is being reduced from $400,000 to 
$250,000 beginning July 1, 2005. In Idaho Code § 6-1603, economic 
damages is described as "mean objectively verifiable monetary loss, 
including but not limited to out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of 
use of property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic service, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of business 
or employment opportunities." In the case of a wrongful death, each gets up 
to $250,000. 
Hearing on H.B. No. 92, Before the Senate Jud. and Rules Comm., March 3, 2003, pp. 1-2 
(emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit "A" to Foster Affidavit.). 
The 2003 amendment changed nothing in terms of the operative language of the 
statute, except for the dollar amount of the cap. Thus, consistent with how the cap has 
always been interpreted, the proponents represented to the legislature that nothing would 
change in terms of how the cap was applied, other than the allowable dollar amount. 
2. The Supreme Court's 2006 Decision in Homer v. Sani-Top Instructs Trial 
Courts to Apply the Cap on a Per Claimant Basis. 
The Idaho Supreme Court specifically has addressed how trial courts are to apply 
I.C. § 6-1603 and did so in the context of a wrongful death case and the pre-2003 version 
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of the statute which is exactly the one at issue here. In Hornerv. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 
230, 141 P .2d 1099 (2006), the plaintiffs were the parents and sister of a two year-old girl 
who tragically had died after being struck by debris from a load of countertops which fell 
from a forklift at a Home Depot. The plaintiffs settled with Home Depot and thereafter 
brought suit against the manufacturer of the countertops, Sani-Top. The jury awarded over 
$4 million in damages, the substantial majority of which was non-economic. The jury also 
apportioned 87% of the fault to Home Depot, the settling non-party, and 13% of the fault to 
Sani-Top. The trial court then entered judgment on that verdict. 
On appeal, Sani-Top argued the trial court should have reduced the non-economic 
damages awarded to each claimant to the cap set forth in § 6-1603 and then multiplied that 
amount by 13% (the percentage of fault attributed to Sani-Top). The Supreme Court 
rejected that argument, holding: 
In this case the district judge correctly treated this as he would any other jury 
verdict, initially applying comparative fault to the total damage award for each 
plaintiff and then multiplying each damage award by the 13% of fault 
attributable to Sani-Top. Then, in preparing to enter judgment against Sani-
Top, he considered I.C. § 6-1603, which provides that no judgment shall be 
entered for a claimant exceeding the statutory cap. Since not one of the 
plaintiff's damage awards for non-economic damages exceeded the statutory 
cap. the judge appropriately entered judgment in compliance with I.C. § 6-
1603. 
Horner, 143 Idaho at 234. 
Horner further explained: 
I.C. § 6-1603 specifically contemplates the amount of damages awarded in a 
lawsuit, as its only limitation is that a "judgment" for non-economic damages 
cannot be entered for a plaintiff that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. 
I.C. § 6-1603 provides no indication, as Sani-Top suggests, that the 
legislature was concerned with out-of-court settlements or that these should 
be taken into consideration when. applying the cap. The language "regardless 
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of the number of persons responsible for the damages or the number of 
actions filed" found in I.C. § 6-1603(2) simply means that regardless of how 
many defendants are listed on the verdict form or how many actions the 
plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, ajudgment cannot be entered 
in favor of "a claimant" that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. After 
properly apportioning liability as found by the jury at trial, a court must then 
determine whether the total non-economic damage award for a particular 
plaintiff exceeds the cap. If so, the court should further reduce each 
defendant's responsibility on a proportional basis, based upon the jury's 
allocation of fault so the plaintiff's total judgment does not exceed the cap. 
-
Id. at 234 (emphasis added). The underscored language makes it clear that the non-
economic damages cap is to be applied individually to each plaintiff/claimant. 
At least three Idaho District Courts have directly addressed the same issue and 
each has reached the same conclusion that Hornerdid. In Stangerv. CRST International, 
CV 02-1003 (March 2005), Judge Butler of the Fifth Judicial District ruled as follows in a 
wrongful death action: 
This is a matter of statutory interpretation. The court finds that § 6-1603 is 
unambiguous and clear on its face and applies per each claimant. Underthe 
statutory definition of "claimant," Kevin Stanger and Judith Stanger are each 
a separate claimant. The derivative nature of Judith Stanger's claim for loss 
of consortium does not change the statutory analysis. The statutory cap on 
non-economic damages does not apply. 
See, Exhibit "B" to Foster Affidavit. (emphasis added). 
Judge Sticklen arrived at the same conclusion in the Fourth Judicial District in Couch 
v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Case No. CV PI 99-00-0289 (February 2001), a 
wrongful death medical malpractice case. The Court held: 
Okay. Well, here's what I think at least on 6-1603, having read all the briefs, 
looked at the cases: I think that there isn't a unitary cap on non-economic 
damages. And I think that because of the reference to "claimant" in our 
statute as opposed to the California statute, which made reference to an 
"action." And it seems to me the purpose of the two statutes were quite 
different. And I also think that because in virtually the entire history of Idaho 
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wrongful death statutes, each plaintiff has been entitled to recover their own 
unique loss. And our jury instructions indicate that. I know of no Idaho case 
that directly says that there's only one person or one group who can make 
the claim for wrongful death and they have to share in whatever damages 
there are. That's just not the way our state has done that. So I think the cap 
applies to each plaintiff separately. And that will be my ruling on that. 
See, Post trial Hearing Trans, p. 2015, line 12 - p. 2016, line 5 attached as Exhibit "C" to 
Foster Affidavit. 
I n Vollmer v. Snake River School District, a case out of the Seventh Judicial District, 
Judge Herndon distinguished Judge Boyle's decision in Clarendon Nat'llns. Co. v. Phillips, 
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35364 (April 5,2005). Judge Herndon wrote: 
The Defendants point to an opinion authored by United States Magistrate 
Judge Larry Boyle entitled Clarendon National Insurance Company v. 
Phillips, wherein Judge Boyle opined that I.C. § 6-1603(2) applies the 
$250,000 non-economic damages cap collectively, regardless of the "number 
of actions filed." Thus, Judge Boyle limited non-economic damages to 
$250,000 per claim, rather than per claimant. 
However, a more recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court is contrary to 
Judge Boyle's interpretation of I.C. § 6-1603(2). On August 8,2006, Justice 
Trout handed down the Horner v. Sani-Top opinion, wherein she wrote: 
... in preparing to enter judgment against Sani-Top, [the 
district judge] considered I.C. § 6-1603, which provides that no 
judgment shall be entered for a claimant exceeding the 
statutory cap. Since not one of the plaintiffs [sic] damage 
awards for non-economic damages exceeded the statutory 
cap, the judge appropriately entered judgment in compliance 
with I.C. § 6-1603. 
* * * 
The language "regardless of the number of persons 
responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed" 
found in I.C. § 6-1603(2) simply means that regardless of how 
many defendants are listed on the verdict form or how many 
actions the plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, a 
judgment cannot be entered in favor of "a claimant" that 
exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. After properly 
apportioning liability as found by the jury at trial, a court must 
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then determine whether the total non-economic damage award 
for a particular plaintiff exceeds the cap. 
Justice Trout's description of the scope of I.C. § 5-311 [sic] concurs with this 
Court's view of the statutory language as limiting each claimant's non-
economic damages to $250,000.00. 
In addition, this Court is moved by the fact that the Idaho Legislature did not 
use language which would clearly limit non-economic damages to a single 
figure, to be divided amongst the claimants. As the Plaintiffs astutely point 
out, the Idaho Legislature used the following damage cap language in the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act: 
The combined aggregate liability of a governmental entity and 
its employees for damages, costs and attorney fees under this 
chapter, on account of bodily or personal injury, death or 
property damage, or other loss as the result of anyone (1) 
occurrence or accident regardless of the number of persons 
injured or the number of claimants, shall not exceed and is 
limited to five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), unless the 
governmental entity has purchased applicable, valid, 
collectible, liability insurance coverage in excess of said limit, 
in which event the controlling limit shall be the remaining 
available proceeds of such insurance. 
I.C. § 6-926 (emphasis added). 
The comparison between the language utilized in I.C. § 6-1603(2) and in I.C. 
§ 6-926, together with the Homer decision, convince this Court that each of 
the Plaintiffs may, if they prevail on the liability issue and if the jury so finds, 
recover up to $250,000 (plus or minus the Idaho Industrial Commission 
adjustment) in non-economic damages from the Defendants. 
See, Exhibit "0" to the Foster Affidavit. (emphasis added). 
In addition, other Idaho District Courts have submitted multiple claimants on verdict 
forms in wrongful death cases. In Jones, et al v. Anesthesia Consultants of Treasure 
Valley, et aI, CV PI 0400486 (November 2006), a wrongful death medical malpractice case 
before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, each claimant, Michael Anthony Jones (decedent's 
spouse), Rhys Alexander Jones, Moria Eibhlin Jones (decedent's children), and Lynne 
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Royer and Harold Bowers (decedent's mother and father) was listed individually on the 
Special Verdict Form and received separate and independent damage awards which 
included non-economic damages. Following post trial motions, individual judgments were 
entered consistent with the procedure outlined in Horner v. Sani-Top, supra. See, Exhibit 
"E" to Foster Affidavit. 
It should be clear that Coonrod's position that the cap applies collectively rather than 
per claimant is fatally flawed. The plain language of the statute does not support 
Coonrod's position, nor does the prevailing law. Accordingly, consistent with Hornerand 
I.C. § 6-1603's plain language, the Court is directed to look at each particular claimant and 
the respective non-economic damage award. If the amount awarded to a particular 
claimant exceeds the cap amount, the Court is to reduce that amount so that the cap is not 
exceeded. If the amount awarded to a particular claimant does not exceed the cap, then 
the special verdict amount should remain unchanged. 
Here, the Court should reduce the non-economic damages awarded to Jose Aguilar 
Sr. from $903,000 to the cap amount applicable to this case, specifically, $682,200.65. 
(See httpllwwc.iic.idaho.govllegal/tort_caps.htm). The Court should similarly reduce the 
non-economic damages awarded to Lorena Aguilar from $785,000 to $682,200.65. The 
Court should reduce the non-economic damages awarded to for Maria Aguilar from 
$725,000.00 to $682,200.65. As to the non-economic damage awards for Alejandro 
Aguilar and Jose Aguilar, Jr., no reduction.s are necessary as those amounts do not exceed 
the applicable cap, respectively. 
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3. This Court Should Construe I.C. § 6-1603 as Applying on an Individual. Per 
Claimant Basis, rather than on a Collective, Per-Incident Basis, in Order to 
Avoid an Unnecessary and Fatal Conflict with the Idaho Constitution's 
Guarantee of Equal Protection and the Idaho Constitution's Proscriptions 
Against Special Legislation. 
The Plaintiffs' construction of I.C. § 6-1603 as being applicable on an individual 
claimant basis, rather than on a collective, all-claimants basis, takes on added force in light 
of the Plaintiffs' contentions that I.C. § 6-1603 would violate the Idaho Constitution if it 
required a single cap to be divided among all claimants. This invokes the venerable 
doctrine that constitutional questions should be avoided whenever possible. 
As our Supreme Court explained nearly two decades ago, '''[i]t is well established 
that a reviewing court will not pass on the constitutionality of a statute unless it is absolutely 
necessary for a determination of the case.'" Mead v. Arnell, 1171daho 660,671,791 P.2d 
410,421 (1990) (emphasis added; quoting Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258,264,561 P.2d 
400,406 (1977».2 
This principle is hardly a new one. More than a century ago, our high court stressed 
that U[t]he rule recognized by all courts is that the validity of a statute will not be passed 
upon in any case unless it is necessary to a determination of the case." Howell v. Board of 
Commissioners of Ada County, 6 Idaho 154, 53 P. 542, 543 (1898). See McGinniss v. 
Davis, 7 Idaho 665,65 P. 364, 365 (1901); Jack v. Village of Grangeville, 9 Idaho 291,74 
P. 969, 975 (1903). 
2 See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,273,92 P.3d 521,523 (2004); State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 
283,833 P.2d 911, 916 (1992); Nampa Christian Schools Foundation v. State, 110 Idaho 918, 920, 
719 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1986); Swensen v. Buildings, Inc., 93 Idaho 466,469,463 P.2d 932, 935 
(1970). 
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Nor is this principle unique to Idaho. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the 
same canon, underscoring that "when deciding which of two plausible statutory 
constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If 
one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail--
whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the 
Court." Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371" 380-81 (2005) (emphasis added; footnote 
omitted). Thus, federal courts consistently "abide by 'a series of rules under which [they] 
avoid passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon [them] for 
decision.'" Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring».3 
As our Supreme Court has further explained, the canon of constitutional avoidance 
holds that "[w]here a statute is opened to two constructions one of which will render it 
unconstitutional, and the other constitutional, the rule of construction must be adopted 
which will uphold it. '" Moon v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 111 Idaho 389, 392, 
724 P.2d 125, 128 (1986) (emphasis added; quoting Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311,317, 
341 P.2d 432,475 (1959». Consequently, courts are "'obligated to seek an interpretation 
of a statute that upholds it constitutionality,'" Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 207 P.3d 963, 
968 (Idaho 2009) (quoting American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2. v. Idaho Dep't of Water 
3 See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003) ('''When the validity of an 
act of the Congress is drawn in question, ... it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question 
may be avoided."') (citation omitted). See also Washington State Grange v. Washington State 
Republican Party, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 
551 U.S. 587, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007). 
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3589 
Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007))4, and are admonished that 
they should "decline to address constitutional issues on appeal when the matter can be 
determined on statutory grounds." Ameritellnns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or 
Community Center Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008). 
As shown above, I.C. § 6-1603 is not susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, 
just one, the one that leads to the conclusion that the statute applies on an individual, per-
claimant basis. Nevertheless, even if one were to assume, arguendo, that I.C. § 6-1603 
was reasonably susceptible to the construction that it somehow applied collectively to all 
claimants, the only way the doctrine articulated in Howell, Poesy, Moon, and their progeny 
(including last year's decision in Mead) can be honored, and the only way this Court can 
avoid entering the constitutional thicket, is by construing I.C. § 6-1603 as applying solely on 
an individual, per-claimant basis and denying Coonrod's Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment. 
4. Idaho Code § 6-1603, If Construed as a Collective Cap on the Damages 
Available to All Claimants, Violates the Idaho Constitution's Guarantee of 
Equal Protection and the Idaho Constitution's Proscriptions Against Special 
Leg islation. 
If this Court concludes that I.C. § 6-1603 must be applied on a collective, all-
claimant basis, ratherthan on an individual, per-claimant basis, the Court should invalidate 
the cap as violative of the equal protection guarantee set forth in Article I, Section 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution5 and also violative of the Constitution's proscription against special 
4 See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195,197,969 P.2d 244,246 (1998); State ex rei. Kidwell v. U. S. 
Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451,454,631 P.2d 622,625 (1981). 
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legislation established by both Article I, Section 2 and Article III, § 19.6 
A collective cap, to be divided regardless of the number of claimants having distinct 
and separate causes of action, would be arbitrary and could not be regarded as a rational 
means of satisfying any legislative purpose, regardless of how important or well-
established. Indeed, if I.C. § 6-1603 is construed as ordaining a collective cap, the statute 
is not only irrational but perverse as the greater the number of persons injured, the less 
each claimant stands to recover. Accordingly, as detailed below, these provisions violate 
the Idaho Constitution's proscriptions against special legislation and the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection. 
Homer definitively established that I.C. § 6-1603 applies to each heir in a wrongful 
death case independently and that the cap applies to each "one of the plaintiffs damage 
awards for non-economic damages." 143 Idaho at 234,141 P.3d at 1103. A court has no 
warrant to apply the cap on an aggregate basis to all claimants but instead, "must ... 
determine whether the total non-economic damage award for a particular plaintiff exceeds 
the cap." 143 Idaho at 235, 141 P.3d at 1104 (emphasis added). 
If, however, as Coonrod contends, I.e. § 6-1603 created a cumulative cap, the 
amounts available for each distinct cause of action would diminish with each eligible 
5 Article I, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides, in full: "All political power is inherent in the 
people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to 
alter, reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or 
immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature." 
6 Article III, Section of the Idaho Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The legislature shall not 
pass local or special laws," inter alia, U[r]egulating the practice of the courts of justice" and [r]eleasing 
or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any person or 
corporation in this state, or any municipal corporation therein." 
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claimant. Thus, if Mrs. Aguilar had been survived solely by her husband, any recovery on 
his claim would only be limited by the total cap applicable at the time. Here, however, 
because Mrs. Aguilar is survived by both her husband and their four children, Coonrod's 
preferred construction of I.C. § 6-1603 would compel this Court to divide a single sum 
among the five claimants. 
Under that construction, I.C. § 6-1603 treats similarly situated claimants differently, 
solely on the basis of how many people may make claims arising out>of the same nucleus 
of operative fact, thus presenting a classic violation of the equal protection guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 2 ofthe Idaho Constitution. This is so under either the "strict scrutiny" that 
applies to statutes that impinge on "fundamental rights," State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 
755,9 P.3d 1217, 1221 (2000) (citation omitted), the intermediate U[m]eans-focus scrutiny" 
that "is employed 'where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory 
classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack of 
relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the statute,'" id. 
(citation omitted), or the even the deferential "[r]ational basis scrutiny [that] applies to all 
other challenges." Id. (citations omitted). 
For the same reasons, if I.C. § 6-1603 were to be construed as applying on a 
collective rather than individual basis it would constitute exactly the kind of arbitrary and 
irrational special privilege legislation that is prohibited by Article III, § 19 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Plaintiffs understand that our Supreme Court rejected a special legislation 
challenge to the cap in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 
1115 (2000), but this precise issue was not before the Court. Moreover, the Kirkland Court 
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precisely held that the damage cap, generally, was not "arbitrary, capricious or 
unreasonable'" insofar as, under the particular circumstances of that case, the cap "'treats 
all persons in similar situations alike.'" 134 Idaho at 469,4 P.3d at 1120 (citation omitted). 
Here, by contrast, Coonrod's proposed construction of I.C. § 6-1603 unreasonably burdens 
only a fraction of all tort victims (those who have been injured in a single incident) and 
capriciously benefits only a sub-set of all tortfeasors (those who injure multiple victims in a 
single incident). 
To date, no Idaho court has had occasion to assess the constitutionality of a 
purportedly collective application of the non-economic damages cap. This, in part, is , 
because it simply has not been the practice in the state of Idaho. (See Comments of 
Judge Sticklen in Couch v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, post trial transcript, 
attached as Exhibit "C" to Foster Affidavit( Pertinently, however, the appellate courts of at 
least four states, including the Supreme Courts of Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin, have 
condemned similar statutes as manifestly unfair and unconstitutional on either equal 
protection or special legislation grounds. 
The leading equal protection case is St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 
961 (Fla. 2000). In Philippe, a mother died while giving birth to her daughter. The 
decedent's husband, as personal representative, brought a medical malpractice wrongful 
7 Were it the practice, it would have an enormous chilling affect on medical malpractice cases in 
the State of Idaho. In essence, in the absence of substantial economic loss, which is not capped, 
cases involving the wrongful death or serious injury of children, the elderly or a non-wage earner 
could not be pursued because the economic cost and risk to the victim and/or the lawyer is simply 
too great in the face of an artificial, arbitrary, and collective non-economic damage cap. A collective 
cap would effectively deny access to the Courts in medical negligence cases to all but the wealthy or 
those who earned substantial incomes. 
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death action against the hospital on behalf of himself and their four surviving children. The 
parties in Phillipe chose to proceed under the statutory alternative dispute process for 
medical malpractice claims. The arbitration panel awarded each child a certain amount in 
non-economic damages, and the husband a still separate amount, for a total of non-
economic damages award that exceeded $1 million. The hospital sought review in and by 
the trial court of the arbitration panel's decision, asserting the cumulative amount of non-
economic damages awarded by the jury exceeded the $250;000 cap set by the medical 
malpractice statute in effect at that time. After the trial court agreed with the hospital, 
plaintiffs appealed. 
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the medical malpractice arbitration cap on 
non-economic damages and squarely rejected the defendant's motion to apply the 
$250,000 non-economic cap collectively, per incident, holding that the cap must instead be 
applied, individually per claimant. The high court determined that Florida's Constitution 
required all similarly situated persons are to be treated equally. Id., 769 SO.2d at 971. The 
court reasoned that in order to be constitutional, the cap on non-economic damages had 
to apply to each claimant individually. Id. at 973. 
The Phillipe Court went on to explain that if it accepted the defendant's reading of 
the $250,000 cap as applying only per incident, then the death of a wife who leaves only a 
surviving spouse to claim the $250,000 is not equal in value to the death of a wife who 
leaves a surviving spouse and minor children. Id. at 972. Phillipe held it was completely 
inconceivable that such a classification could bear a "rational relationship to the 
Legislature's stated goal of alleviating the [alleged] financial crisis in the medical liability 
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industry," and noted that such a categorization offended the fundamental notion of equal 
justice under the law and could only be described as purely arbitrary and unrelated to any 
State interest. Id. Thus, in the final analysis: 
Differentiating between a single claimant and multiple claimants [asserting 
consortium claims] bears no rational relationship to the Legislature's stated 
goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability insurance industry 
.... We fail to see how this classification bears any rational relationship to 
the Legislature's stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical 
liability industry. Such a categorization offends the fundamental notion of 
equal justice under the law and can only be described as purely arbitrary and 
unrelated to any state interest. 
Id., 769 So. at971-72 (emphasis added). See Wrightv. Barr, 62 S.W.3d 509, 537-38 (Mo. 
App.2001). 
Wisconsin's highest court followed similar reasoning in invalidating, on state 
constitutional equal protection grounds, a cap on non-economic damages in malpractice 
cases, under which the claims of the patient's spouse, minor children, or parents for loss of 
society and companionship could not exceed $350,000. Ferdon ex reI. Petrucelli v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 466 (Wise. 2005). See also 
Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (III. 1997) (holding that $500,000 cap on 
non-economic damages constituted impermissible special legislation, in violation of the 
Illinois Constitution); Wright v. Central Du Page Hasp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (III. 1976) 
(invalidating provision that limited recovery only in medical malpractice cases as arbitrary 
and unconstitutional special litigation); Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (III. 1972) (striking 
down, as special legislation, automobile injury compensation scheme that applied to some, 
but not to all, classes of automobiles). 
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Coonrod's proposed construction of I.C. § 6-1603 would present the same types of 
special legislation and equal protection violations. The Plaintiffs here sued the Defendants, 
establishing to the satisfaction of the jury that the Defendants negligently treated Mrs. 
Aguilar and depriving her survivors of support, companionship, guidance and the other 
elements of recoverable damage under Idaho's Wrongful Death statute. The lawsuit 
comprises five separate, unique, and independent claims. The jury quite obviously 
understood and considered the distinct and unique nature of those claims in its 
deliberations in its determination of the final verdict. 
Unless this Court holds that I.C. § 6-1603 either applies per claimant or, if it applies 
per incident, is unconstitutional, all claimants in the instant case will be obliged to divide a 
single lump sum of non-economic damages and thus will be treated differently than if Mrs. 
Aguilar's widow were the only one who filed a claim. For all of these reasons, the cap 
violates both the Idaho Constitution's guarantee of equal protection and the Idaho 
Constitution's ban on special legislation. 
5. Coonrod's Fallback Arguments Are Equally Flawed. 
As a fallback argument, Coonrod contends that I.C. § 6-1603 must be read together 
with Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311. In that regard, Coonrod suggests that the 
language of the wrongful death statute which states that the heirs of a decedent may 
maintain "an action" for damages, coupled with I.C. § 6-1603 is language "regardless of the 
number of actions filed", somehow dictates that the statutory damage cap applies 
collectively. 
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As detailed previously, both I.C. § 6-1603's plain language and the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Horner undermine rather than supports Coonrod's position. Horner explicitly 
addressed the language relied upon by Coonrod and correctly noted that the provision 
"regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages or the number of 
actions filed" simply means that regardless of how many defendants are listed on the 
verdict form, or how many actions the plaintiff brings to collect damages, the judgment 
entered in favor of "a claimant" cannot exceed the cap. Again, it is pertinent to note that 
Horner was a wrongful death case involving three claimants. Horner, 143 Idaho at 234. 
Alternatively, Coonrod argues that the Court may find I.C. § 6-1603 ambiguous thus 
allowing the Court to consider whether Coonrod's proposed construction of the statute is 
reasonable and similarly look at public policy considerations and the legislative history of 
the enactment. The foundation for this argument is based on Coonrod's incorrect assertion 
that the term "claimant" is not defined by the statute. See Coonrod's Memo, P. 6. 
However, as addressed in detail above, I.C. § 6-1601 (2) clearly defines the term "claimant". 
Neither the provisions of I.C. § 6-1603 or the statutory definition of "claimant" are 
ambiguous. 
Coonrod makes another flawed argument when he suggests that the Idaho 
Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when passing new legislation. 
Thus, according to Coonrod, when the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. § 6-1603 it was 
deemed to be aware that the wrongful death statute identified those persons entitled to 
bring a claim for wrongful death and similarly that those persons were only entitled to 
maintain "an" action. 
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First, there is no "single action" rule in Idaho and, even in wrongful death, whether a/l 
heirs must be joined or can pursue claims independently is a defense that is subject to 
waiver. Thus, if the defendant does not object if all heirs are not parties, or otherwise fails 
to join them in the action, the defendant is deemed to have waived the protection. See 
Hogan v. Hermann, 101 Idaho 893, 623 P.2d 900 (1980). Moreover, given the specific 
inclusion of a wrongful death claim within I.C. § 6-1603's language, it is clear that the 
Legislature meant to incorporate wrongful death actions within the terms of the statute and 
there is obviously no language which suggests that the damage cap should be applied 
differently in a wrongful death action from how it is to be applied in a claim for personal 
injury. 
Most importantly, if the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing statutes, it is 
patently clear that it knew exactly how to cap damages on a per claim basis, rather than 
per claimant, given Idaho's Torts Claim Act, specifically I.C. § 6-926. I.C. § 6-926 limits the 
"combined aggregate liability" of a government entity and its employees to $500,000.00 for 
claims arising, inter alia, out of personal injury or death. The cap applies regardless of the 
number of persons injured or number of claimants. Indeed, the Legislature's failure to use 
language similar or the same as that used in I.C. § 6-926 is essentially irrefutable proof that 
the Legislature did NOT intend to cap non-economic damages on a collective basis in 
passing I.C. § 6-1603 for had it so intended, it would have been a simple matter to use the 
language from that statutory scheme. 
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6. The Cases Coonrod Cites from Other States Are Inapposite. 
Coonrod cites cases from three other jurisdictions for the proposition that there is 
but one cap for non-economic damages in Idaho. As will be shown below, those three 
jurisdictions, California, Missouri and Colorado, have statutory schemes vastly different 
from Idaho Code §§ 6-1601 and 6-1603 and the cases Coonrod cites from those three 
jurisdictions therefore are completely inapposite. 
Coonrod first cites Yates v. Pollock, 194 Cal. App. 3d 195, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ca. 
App. 2d Dist. 1987). In Yates, the wife and children of a deceased gallbladder surgery 
patient successfully sued the operating surgeon for malpractice. The defendant physician 
appealed the verdict after the trial court refused to reduce the jury's award to the statutory 
maximum set for injury actions by the California legislature. 
The California Court of Appeals first held that the California non-economic damage 
cap applied to wrongful death actions, and then held the cap applied to all plaintiffs 
collectively as opposed to individually. The Yates Court stated: 
Civil Code section 3333.2 provides in pertinent part: '(a) In any action for 
injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence, the 
injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover non-economic losses to 
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, 
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage. (b) in no action shall the 
amount of damages for non-economic losses exceed two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($250 000). 
Yates, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 198. (emphasis in original). The California court found the 
statute to be unambiguous and in addition found that regardless of the wording of the 
statute it applied to claims for wrongful death. 
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Yates concluded the cap applies to all plaintiffs collectively, asserting "it is evident 
from the terms of the statute that while each injured plaintiff is entitled to seek non-
economic damages, the maximum recovery permitted in any single medical malpractice 
action is $250,000, regardless of the number of plaintiffs involved .... Yates, 194 Cal. App. 
3d at 200-201 (emphasis in original). 
The instant action is governed by Idaho law, not California law. A comparison ofthe 
Idaho limitation on non-economic damages statute, I.C. § 6-1603, the definition of 
"claimant" contained in I.C. § 6-1601 and California Civil Code § 3333.2 reveals that the 
two statutory schemes are so divergent as to render Yates meaningless in the context of 
an Idaho wrongful death case. 
Idaho Code § 6-1601(2) defines "claimant" as any "party" to a civil action. Idaho 
Code § 6-1603 states, pertinently, that in no action seeking damages, including death, shall 
a judgment be entered for "a claimant" exceeding the amount of the statutory cap. Thus, 
rather than a cap on the "action", the limitation imposed on non-economic damages clearly 
applies per claimant, or "party" to the civil action. 
In this case, the parties were Jose Aguilar Sr., Jose Aguilar, Jr., Maria Aguilar, 
Alejandro Aguilar and Lorena Aguilar. They are the Plaintiffs, they are the parties, they are 
the claimants. 
Coonrod also cites a Missouri case, Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W. 2d 880 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2004). However, Missouri law, like California law, is far different than Idaho law. 
Cook determined that under the applicable Missouri statutory scheme, there could be but 
one, indivisible lawsuit regardless of the number of heirs or claimants: 
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Under the wrongful death statute, the surviving spouse, children, parents, or 
others named in the statute may sue for damages for the wrongful death of 
the decedent, section 537.080.1. Only one action, however, may be brought 
under section 537.080 against anyone defendant for the death of anyone 
person. Section 537.080.2. Thus the term 'plaintiff' in section 538.210 is 
ambiguous when considered in the context of a wrongful death action. 
142 S.W. 2d at 887. 
The Missouri court went on to examine the legislative history to determine the intent 
of the legislation in light of § 538.21 O's failure to define "plaintiff." The court, through an 
arguably torturous route, concluded that the term "plaintiff' actually meant all plaintiffs in a 
wrongful death lawsuit. 
At the time Chapter 538 was enacted, the wrongful death statute identified 
those persons entitled to sue and recover damages for a wrongful death, 
namely the surviving spouse, children, parents, or others named in the 
statute. Section 537.080.1. It provided, however, that "[only one action may 
be brought under this section against anyone defendant for the death of any 
one person." Section 537.080.2. Thus, the wrongful death statute provided 
that anyone plaintiff could settle the claim for damages without joinder 
therein by any other person entitled to recover damages, section 537.095.1, 
and that a recovery by anyone plaintiff shall be apportioned by the court 
according to the laws of descent or in proportion to the losses suffered by 
each person entitled to share in the proceeds. Section 537.095.2. In 
interpreting these statutes, the Missouri Supreme Court has said, "The 
wrongful death statute creates but one indivisible cause of action which 
remains the same whether enforceable by the surviving spouse, by the minor 
child or children, or by the others named in the statute," Knowing that the 
wrongful death statute created an indivisible cause of action enforceable by 
one or more persons, the legislature chose not to increase the non-economic 
damages cap where more than one person brings a wrongful death action." 
142 S.W. 2d at 888 (citation omitted). 
Again, Missouri's cap on non-economic damages in a wrongful death case is far 
different than Idaho law on the same subject. First, the single action "rule" can be waived 
so it is not really a rule at all. Second, I.C. § 6-1601 defines "claimant" in the singular. 
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Third, the language of I.C. § 6-1603 applies the limitation on non-economic damages to "a 
claimant," not to all claimants, and that statute specifically incorporates claims for damages 
in a wrongful death case, effectively mooting any need to separately analyze Idaho's 
wrongful death statute. 
Finally, Coonrod cites Mitson v. AG Engineering Co., Inc. 835 F. Supp. 572 (D. 
Colo. 1993), once again for the proposition that the limitation on non-economic damages 
applies collectively in Idaho. However, as with the cases from California and Missouri; the 
argument fails because of the differing language of the statutes at issue. 
In Mitson, a wrongful death action was brought by a widow and her two daughters. 
Each plaintiff sought to recover the statutory limit of $250,000. The federal court, sitting in 
diversity, ruled that the terms of recovery would be determined exclusively from the 
wrongful death statute. The Court then determined that the statute was silent as to 
whether the limitation applied to plaintiffs individually or collectively, noting that the 
operative Colorado statute provides: 
All damages accruing under section 13-21-202 shall be sued for and 
recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in 13-
21-201, and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they 
deem fair and just ... including damages for non-economic loss ... subject to 
the limitations in section 13-21-102.5 and including within non-economic loss 
or injury, damages for grief, loss of companionship, pain and suffering, and 
emotional stress, to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue ... There 
shall be only one civil action under this part 2 for recovery of damages for the 
wrongful death of anyone decedent. Notwithstanding anything in this section 
or in section12-21-102.5 to the contrary, there shall be no recovery under 
this part 2 for non-economic loss ... in excess of two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars. 
835 F. Supp. at 573-74. Mitson stated that it could not determine, from the text of he 
statute alone, whether the cap applied per claimant or per incident. Thus, the court looked 
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to the legislative history and intent for the answer: 
Neither section 13-21-203(1) not section 13-21-102.5 distinguish the amount 
on non-economic recovery for multiple versus single plaintiffs. These 
statutory provisions read together cap the non-economic recovery in the one 
civil action. If the Colorado General Assembly intended that the statutory cap 
be applicable to each individual plaintiff. it could have explicitly said so. It is 
not for the courts to supply this missing language absent evidence of 
legislative intent that it be there. 
835 F. Supp. at 574 (emphasis added). The Court went on to quote a Colorado legislator' 
who had added a floor amendment to the statute indicating: "For the wrongful death of any 
person there may be only one action and one recovery and not multiple actions by multiple 
survivors, .... " Id. (emphasis in original. 
Idaho's statute, unlike the Colorado one, not only defines the term claimant to 
include "any party", it is also very clear that the non-economic damage cap applies on a per 
claimant basis. Thus, the peculiarities of the Colorado statute do not apply here. 
Finally, there is no reason for this Court to look at the non-economic damage cap 
statutes from other states or case law interpreting those statutes because Idaho's Supreme 
Court has already addressed the statute at issue here and has similarly directed how it 
should be applied. See. Homer v. Sani-Top, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully urge this Court to deny 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health Care Center's motion to alter or 
amend the Judgment entered in this case with the exception of the necessary reductions to 
the non-economic damages claims of Jose Aguilar, Sr., Lorena Aguilar and Maria Aguilar 
as conceded in Part 2, P.8 of this memorandum. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D., AND 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION TO THE 
JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT AND THEIR MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO 
APPLY THE STATUTORY CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS 
COLLECTIVELY - 25 
DATED This ~ ~ay of June, 2009. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~4 ~ay of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman M 
Tolman & Brizee, PC ~ 
132 3rd Ave. E 0 
P.O. Box 1276 0 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health 
Care Center 
Gary T. Dance I2(J 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & [8l 
Fields Chartered 0 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 0 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 10 83204-0817 









Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D., AND 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION TO THE 
JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT AND THEIR MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO 
APPLY THE STATUTORY CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS 




_F_' A.k~ o P.M. 
David E. Comstock, ISB #: 2455 
John A. Bush, ISB # 3925 
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
JUN 2 ~ 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
,~UTY 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Byron V. Foster, ISB #: 2760 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of Maria A. Aguilar, ) 
deceased, and as the natural father and ) 
guardian of GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, ) 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA ) 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, JR., ) 
heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN 
COONROD, M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH 
CARE CENTER, an Idaho corporation, JOHN 
and JANE DOES I through X, employees of one 















Case No. CV 05-5781 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS 
NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
FOR A REMITTITUR, AND 
MOTION FOR JNOV 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A REMITTITUR, AND MOTION FOR JNOV - 1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Coonrod and Primary Health Care Center (referred to collectively as 
"Coonrod") have moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for remittitur of the economic 
and non-economic damages. In addition, Coonrod moves pursuant to I.R.C.P 50(b) for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (hereinafter "JNOV"). For ease of analysis, Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition will follow the format utilized by Coonrod in his Memorandum 




A. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR 
1. The Court did not Err by Refusing to Allow Coonrod to Prove his Affirmative 
Defense by Calling Plaintiffs' Experts. 
Defendant Coonrod contends that the Court erred in not allowing him to present 
evidence of non-party negligence by calling Plaintiffs' experts. Coonrod acknowledges that 
he carries the burden to establish, through direct expert testimony, the negligence of other 
non-party medical providers. Indeed, Coonrod carried that burden from the point that he 
raised the issue as an affirmative defense in his Answer to the Complaint. 
When this matter was raised at trial, the Court requested briefing on the issue and 
then gave its ruling. There is nothing new raised by Defendant Coonrod in terms of the 
position set forth in his Motion for New Trial and certainly there is no basis for the Court to 
change from its prior opinion. As the Plaintiffs noted in their briefing, the Court's 
Scheduling Order, the Idaho discovery rules and Idaho legal precedent all support that 
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decision. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), parties are required to identify 
each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the 
subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of 
the opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. In White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 
104 P.3d 356 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court expressly prohibited a party from calling 
the opposing party's expert witness if there has been no disclosure of such testimony. As 
the Court pointed out, the Idaho discovery rules contain no provision addressing whether a 
party may call the opposing party's experts at trial. 140 Idaho at 889, 104 P.3d at 363. 
However, in maintaining the spirit and purpose of the rules on discovery, the Court 
specifically stated that a "general reservation of rights to call the other party's witnesses is 
not the type of disclosure envisioned by the rule, in that it does not apprise the opposing 
party of the identity of the specific expert to be relied upon and does not reveal the general 
substance of that testimony or its relation to the legal theory of (the party attempting to call 
the witness)." Id. Citing, Gallo v. Peninsula Hospital, 164 Cal.App.3d 899, 903-904,211 
Cal.Rptr. 27,30 (1985). 
Washington Courts have similarly held that a party attempting to call the opposing 
party's witness without first disclosing the witness in discovery is prohibited from doing so. 
Allied Financial SeNices, Inc. v. Mangum, 72 Wash.App. 164,864 P.2d 1 (1993). In that 
case, the court determined that the Washington rules on discovery, similar to the Idaho 
Rules, require that "(a)/I witnesses must be listed, including those whom a party plans to 
call as a rebuttal witness." (Emphasis in opinion). Id. at 168. Thus, the Court held that, in 
order to call witnesses at trial, parties must list "any" and al/ witnesses, including those 
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listed by the opposing party, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause. Id. 
The Court in Defferv. Shop-Rite Supermarkets Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 540753 A.2d. 
1228 (2000) also recognized that "the fact that a plaintiff may settle with some but not all 
defendants in advance of trial can hardly be surprising to any defense attorney." 753 A.2d. 
at 1231. The rules of discovery are premised upon the idea that "no party should build its 
case by foraging for opinions from the experts of the other party." Graham v. Gielchinsky, 
126 N.J. 361, 599 A.2d 149 (1991). Citing, Smith v. Ford Motor eo., 626 F.2d 784,792 
(10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 1363, 67 L.Ed.2d 344 (1981). 
In the present case, Coonrod cannot assert surprise that he would be required to 
carry the burden of establishing fault against settling or dismissed defendants. Indeed 
acknowledging the burden which he carries, Coonrod never made a substantive disclosure 
of any testimony necessary to prove his affirmative defense or otherwise comply with the 
obligations of Rule 26(b). In fact, when the Plaintiffs sought to discover the underlying 
basis of Coonrod's affirmative defense that other medical providers, or non-parties, were 
negligent, the Defendants specifically advised the Plaintiffs that they had "no specific 
opinion regarding the negligence of other persons or parties" and that they had raised the 
"affirmative defense for the purpose of preserving the same." See Plaintiffs' Response 
Bench Brief filed April 29, 2009, p. 4-5. Other than a general reservation of rights as to 
Plaintiffs' experts, Defendant Coonrod made no effort to disclose which particular medical 
care provider seen by Maria Aguilar he contended was negligent. Given that Mrs. Aguilar 
saw six physicians, in addition to Dr. Coonrod during the relevant time, the failure to 
disclose even this basic information is clearly in violation of Rule 26(b). 
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Moreover, as the Court is well aware, Defendant Coonrod challenged the very 
admissibility of the testimony which he now claims he was denied the opportunity to 
present. In the face of the noted discovery answers, the failure to specifically identify any 
expert to testify that other medical providers were negligent, whether party to the case or 
not, and given that these Defendants were challenging the very foundation of the Plaintiffs' 
experts, it is certainly unreasonable, and prejudicial, to expect that the Plaintiffs were fairly 
apprised of Coonrod's intent to put on evidence in support of his affirmative defense. 
Rule 26(b) unequivocally requires that the substance of an expert's opinion be 
disclosed. This includes, "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the 
basis and reasons therefore." Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(4). The Defendants made no such 
disclosure. For all of the reasons discussed during trial, and above, it is clear that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion or make an error of law. Rather, the Court properly 
exercised its inherent discretion regarding admissibility of evidence and expert opinion and 
similarly applied the prevailing Idaho case law which addresses the issue. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the JUry on Proximate Cause. 
Defendant Coonrod contends that the Court erred by not giving a "but for" proximate 
cause instruction and that the instruction given was a substantial factor instruction. 
Coonrod argues that the but for instruction was proper because this is a single cause case. 
Respectfully, it would have been an error for the Court not to give a substantial factor 
instruction. 
Under Idaho law, in a medical malpractice action where there is evidence of two or 
more possible causes of the plaintiff's injury, rather than using the "but for" test the jury 
must be instructed that the doctor's negligence "was a proximate cause of the injury if it 
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was a substantial factor in bringing about the damage." Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591 , 
591, 818 P.2d 295,295 (1991). The Fussell Court noted that it had "specifically reject[ed]" 
the inclusion of the "but for" test where more than one cause could have brought about the 
injury. Id. "The but for instruction and the substantial factor instruction are mutually 
exclusive." Le'Gall v. Lewis County, 129 Idaho 182, 187,923 P.2d 427, 432 (1996). In 
short, the "but for" test may be employed when there is a single possible cause, but when 
there are multiple possible causes of the plaintiff's injury a "substantial factor" instruction 
must be given instead. Id. at 186-87, 923 P.2d at 431-32. 
In Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005), the substantial factor 
and but for instructions were discussed and analyzed at length, particularly the distinction 
between actual cause and legal cause. In determining the actual cause, the Newberry 
Court held the "substantial factor" test is appropriate when there are multiple possible 
causes that lead to the injury. It is the defendant's conduct (actual cause) that inflicts the 
harm, but it is the law (legal cause or true proximate cause) that determines whether 
liability for that conduct attaches. Newberry, 142 Idaho @ 288. 
In Newberry, the trial court's proximate cause instruction was taken from standard 
pattern jury instruction 2.30.2 but the trial court omitted the following language: "It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway." 
Defendant Coonrod proposed exactly the same language here. The Newberry Court 
upheld the district court's omission of the sentence because the excluded language was a 
rephrasing of the "but for" test and therefore inappropriate in a multiple cause case. Id. @ 
289. As the defendant was prohibited from dOing in Newberry, the Defendants in this case 
"cannot simultaneously point to a second cause independent of (his) negligence and at the 
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same time maintain that this is a single cause case." Newberry, 142 Idaho @ 289 
Here, Plaintiffs put on proof that Dr. Coonrod and/or Dr. Newman were each 
negligent and a cause of Maria's death. In addition, Plaintiffs put on proof that Mrs. Aguilar 
suffered a series of previous sub ·Iethal pulmonary emboli which was contrary to the 
Defendants' argument that the final event was the only pulmonary event that occurred. 
Thus, having two defendants, each of whom could have been found to be independently 
liable, and conflicting evidence as to the progression of symptoms, makes this a multiple 
causation case requiring use of a substantial factor jury instruction. There was no error by 
the Court. 
3. The Court Properly listed each Plaintiff Individually. 
Defendants Coonrod and Primary Health contend that the Court misapplied the law 
by listing each Plaintiff separately on the verdict form. However, because each Plaintiff 
was a separate and independent Plaintiff, each with their own peculiar and individual claim, 
the Court properly identified each Plaintiff individually on the verdict form. Moreover, and 
as set forth in the concurrently filed brief relative to the non-economic damage cap, the 
Court was required to separately list each Plaintiff in order to properly apply the damage 
cap. See Hornerv. Sani-Top, 143 Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099(2006). Plaintiffs incorporate 
that brief as their response to this issue. 
4. The JUry'S Award of Damages was not Excessive 
Defendant Coonrod contends that both the Jury's award of economic and non-
economic damages was excessive because, as he argues, they were awarded under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. The statutory framework for permissible damages in a 
wrongful death case is the Idaho Wrongful Death Statute, I.C. § 5-311, which states, U(i)n 
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every action under this section, such damages may be given as under all the 
circumstances of the case as may be just". This catchall phrase is intended to be broad in 
scope to allow for compensation to be awarded to claimants who have lost loved ones at 
the hands of another's negligence and have proven a just award of damages to the jury. 
From Idaho precedent and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), the general rule 
regarding a Motion for New Trial based upon excessive damages is that "it is a jury function 
to set the damage award based on its sense,offairness and justice." Myers v. Workmen's 
Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,506,95 P.3d 977, 988 (2004). Accordingly, the trial court 
must defer to the jury unless it is apparent to the court "that there is a great disparity 
between the two damage awards and that the disparity cannot be explained away as 
simply the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the plaintiffs injuries in two 
equallyfairways." Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187,1196 (1986). 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6): the trial court is not merely to weigh its 
calculations as against those of the jury. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 7,33 P .2d 1234 
(1986) (remanded and appealed on other grounds), ("Sanchez 1 "). Rather, the trial court 
is to weigh the evidence to determine if the jury's verdict is supportable by the evidence 
and when it thinks not, it should grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). 
[I]f the trial judge discovers that his determination of damages is so 
substantially different from that of the jury that he can only explain this 
difference as resulting from some unfair behavior, or what the law calls 
"passion or prejudice," on the part of the jury against one or some of the 
parties, then he should grant a new trial. How substantial this difference must 
be is impossible to formulate with any degree of accuracy. It will necessarily 
vary with the factual context of each case and the trial judge's sense of 
fairness and justice. Frequent characterizations have included the idea that 
the disparity must "shock the conscience" of the trial judge or lead him to 
conclude that it would be "unconscionable" to let the damage award stand as 
the jury set it. 
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Quick, 111 Idaho at 769-70, 727 P.2d at 1197. (Citation omitted, emphasis in original, 
further emphasis added). 
While the Idaho Wrongful Death Statute, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
standard set forth in Quick v. Crane trump Defendant Coonrod's argument that the Court 
should overturn the Jury's verdict, Plaintiffs address the Defendant's additional arguments 
below. 
a) Economic Damages 
Sanchez 1 is instructive on this issue. In that case, the Plaintiff lost the use of his 
hand from a farming accident. 112 Idaho 609,612, 733 P.2d 1234, 1237. The Plaintiff 
testified regarding the impairment of his ability to perform household activities and he 
presented a "day in the life of' video specifically detailing his difficulties with day-to-day 
activities. 112 Idaho at 624, 733 P.2d at 1249. The Plaintiff also retained an expert 
witness who used statistical data provided by the Bureau of Labor to place a value on the 
Plaintiff's loss of household services. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that "Idaho law 
provides that the measure of damages is ordinarily such as will compensate for loss or 
prejudice suffered. Moreover, there is no set standard for measuring the value of human 
health or happiness." Id. 
The Court further held that the Plaintiff's own testimony more than adequately 
provided a foundation upon which the Plaintiffs expert economist could apply the statistics 
provided by the Bureau of Labor. Id. Such testimony was, therefore, admissible. Id. 
Thus, this Court can deduce from Sanchez that in the present case, the evidence 
presented at trial regarding the economic loss of Maria Aguilar's household service from 
her own family and from Cory Hofman was a competent and admissible economic analysis 
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valuing the loss of Maria's household contributions. 
Defendant Coonrod cites to a Federal Court Case out of Texas, Tello v. United 
States, 608 F.Supp.2d 805 (W.O. Tex. 2009) to support his argument that household 
services do not constitute economic damages and attempts to liken Idaho Code §6-1601 to 
the Mississippi statute cited by the Tello Court. The statute, however, does not contain the 
same statutory language as the Idaho statute defining economic damages. 
The Mississippi statute states: 
"actual economic damages" means "objectively verifiable pecuniary damages 
arising from medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, 
custodial care, disabilities, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of 
income, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement 
of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of 
employment, loss of business or employment opportunities." 
MISS.CODE. ANN. § 11-1-60(b). 
In Idaho, the definition of economic damages is as follows: 
(3) "Economic damages" means objectively verifiable monetary loss, 
including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of 
use of property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of 
business or employment opportunities. 
Idaho Code § 6-1601 (3). 
One difference in the two definitions of economic damages is that the Mississippi 
definition uses the phrase "pecuniary damages" and the Idaho Statute includes the phrase 
"monetary loss." While the difference may not seem significant, the connotative 
distinctions are noteworthy. "Pecuniary damages" denotes specific economic or financial 
damages, while a "monetary loss" denotes a generalized calculation of compensation. Of 
further significance is the fact that the Idaho statute uses the phrase: "including but not 
limited to," whereas, the Mississippi statute does not. 
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It is apparent that the Idaho legislature intended to provide latitude in the award for 
economic damages by not making the definition all encompassing. "Including but not 
limited to" incorporates those losses verifiable by economic analysis but for which the 
plaintiff is not actually incurring expenses. The Idaho legislature specifically created this 
definition with the caveat that the damages must be "objectively verifiable." The value of 
Maria's household services is a value that is objectively verifiable and clearly capable of 
calculation, as evidenced by Cory Hofman's report, (attached as Exhibit "K" to the Affidavit 
of Byron Foster), and Mr. Hofman's testimony at trial. It is a loss that has occurred and 
unquestionably, will occur in the future. 
Furthermore, the Court in Tello specifically noted that "there (was) no evidence the 
loss of these services necessarily resulted in direct financial loss to the, survivors, and so in 
this respect it is not a pecuniary loss." 608 F.Supp.2d 805, 809. Accordingly, the Tello 
Court held the plaintiff's recovery attaches to the non-economic loss of companionship and 
society inherent in her relationship with herfamily. Id. To the contrary, in the present case, 
Jose Jr. and Maria ("Lupe") testified at great length as to the contributions Maria Aguilar 
made to the household, including, for example, shopping for food, planning and preparing 
the meals, doing the laundry for a six person household and cleaning the home and 
collecting and paying the bills. These services were either lost entirely or had to be 
replaced through the selfless efforts and sacrifice of other family members, most notably 
"Lupe" and Jose Sr. 
Both the Mississippi and Idaho statutes refer to "the cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services. Again, in Tello, there was no proof of what the cost of obtaining 
substitute domestic services was for the decedent. Conversely, in the present case, not 
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only was there testimony regarding the nature and extent of Maria's services in the home, 
but there was expert witness testimony from Cory Hofman regarding the economic value of 
Maria's services and what the cost of replacing those services would be. Mr. Hofman was 
succinctly able to calculate the value of those services into an "objectively verifiable" 
monetary amount. Mr. Hofman's report indicates that because there is no labor market for 
household services, an economic analysis of household services has been conducted by 
many economists, including himself, to arrive at the value ofthose services so that a jury 
wishing to award damages for the proven loss of household services does not have to 
delve into the realm of speculation as to how to value the loss. See, Affidavit of Cory 
Hofman, attached as Exhibit uK" to the Affidavit of Byron Foster. There is no SUbstantive 
difference between the nature of the economic testimony and loss figures presented by Mr. 
Hofman than those presented, allowed and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Sanchez v. Gailey, supra. 
In addition, the Texas Tello Court refers to pecuniary damages that are "actually 
incurred." Nowhere in Idaho's statutory definition of economic damages is it required that 
the loss be actually incurred. Rather, the only requirement is that it be objectively 
verifiable. To read the word "cost" into the Idaho definition and similarly requiring that it be 
a cost actually incurred begs the question of how courts are to legally handle the value of 
any loss that has yet to be actually incurred. Notably, the Idaho Jury Instruction 9.01 on 
general damages refers to the reasonable value of necessary services, not the "cost". 
Accordingly, it would be in error to require that the cost must be incurred to be 
compensable. Such an outcome was not intended by the legislature. 
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It is also important to note that under Texas law, the loss of a homemaker's services 
is included in non-economic damages, at least in part because the "positive benefits 
flowing from love, comfort, companionship and society which plaintiffs would have 
experienced if decedent had lived" are not economic in nature. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 
S.W.2d 683,687-88 (Tex.1987); Reeder v. Allport, 218 S.W.3d 817, 819-20 (Tex.App. 
2007). The Texas courts imply, in no uncertain terms, that because a homemaker's 
services "flow" from love and comfort, such services hold no economic monetary value. 
Albeit a critical observation of the Texas court, the patently chauvinistic nature of this 
suggestion lies in the outcome: the value of the homemaker for cleaning the toilet is 
nothing because it is couched as an activity of love, while the compensation 'for the 
employed spouse is a lost salary because it is capable of calculation. Not only does this 
demean the value of a homemaker'S activities and responsibilities at home, but it suggests 
that the employed spouse's salary is earned for income rather than for love of the family. 
The Idaho legislature and Courts have indicated that Idaho has a more progressive take on 
the value of household services. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court of appeals provides further insight into the 
economic value of household services in Corlett v. Smith, 107 N.M. 707, 763 P.2d 1172 
(N.M.App.1988). Corlett involved the wrongful death of a husband and father. The 
decedent's son testified that before he died, his father did about 30 hours of household 
related services a week. 107 N.M. 707, 713, 763 P.2d 1172, 1178. The court articulated: 
When husband performed household services, other income-producing 
activity could not be undertaken. Further, specific costs would be incurred if 
someone else were retained to perform them. We believe the value of those 
services is an evidentiary item admissible in this case in establishing the 
present worth of husband's life. Cf. Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 
P .2d 673 (Ct.App.1972) (the factfinder may consider evidence of household 
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· services to the statutory beneficiaries in awarding damages for the pecuniary 
value of a life). 
There is no sensible reason why the household services of the husband in Corlett should 
be treated any differently than Maria Aguilar, as a wife and mother. Accordingly, those 
costs are economic losses suffered by the Aguilars. Of significance, Defendant Coonrod 
cites to only the Tello case to support his argument that household services are to be 
considered a non-economic loss. Against the Defendant's sole case are a multitude of 
other jurisdictions, including many in the Ninth Circuit, that have found to the contrary. See 
also, Bergmann v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mo. 1981), revd on other 
grounds, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. Mo.); Driscoll V. United States, 456 F. Supp. 143,3 Fed. R. 
Evid. Servo (LCP) 740 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd without op., 605 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. Del.) (under 
Maryland law) (holding that the value of husband's household services are pecuniary in 
nature); Matheny V. Tennessee, Valley Authority 557 F.3d 311 (Sixth Cir. 2009) (holding 
that value of husband's household services are pecuniary in nature). Babinec V. Yabuki, 
799 P.2d 1325, 1337 (Alaska1990) (cost of replacement for household services upheld 
when costs had not yet been incurred); Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. V. Arnoult, 114 Nevada 
223, 250, 955 P.2d 661, 678 (Nev. 1998) (household services are a separate 
compensable economic loss); Romo V. Ford Motor Co., 113 Cal.AppAth 738, 758, 6 
Ca/'Rptr.3d 793, 809 (2003); (loss of household services are considered economic 
damages); Eddo v. Xuzhou Senya Plywood Co., Ltd., 2009 WL 1444449 (W.O. Wash. 
2009) (on default judgment and after expert witness testimony on the value of decedent's 
household services, such services are an economic loss separate from non-economic 
damages); Thorn V. Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp., 761 N.W.2d 414, 427, 281 Mich. App. 
644, 657 (2008) (household services are economic in nature and are separate and 
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Idaho standard jury instructions are also helpful. The Idaho Jury Instruction on 
damages, IOJI9.05, does not state that loss for household services must be incurred to be 
compensable. IOJI 9.05, "Damages for Wrongful Death," states: 
"If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the 
jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by 
defendant's negligence. 
(emphasis added). Again, the testimony and report of Cory Hofman, and the testimony of 
the members of the Aguilar family proved the monetary value of Maria Aguilar's household 
services and the Jury determined that Defendant Coonrod's actions caused those damages. 
The Jury applied IDJI 9.05, as instructed by the Court, to arrive at its calculation of damages. 
Even more compelling is the IOJI instruction on general damages. IDJ19.01 states: 
"If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the 
jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by 
the defendant's negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries; 
5. The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and 
expenses incurred as a result of the injury [and the present cash 
value of medical care and expenses reasonably certain and 
necessary to be required in the future]; 
2. The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of the 
injury; 
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3. The present cash value of the future earning capacity lost 
because of the injury, taking into consideration the earning 
power, age, health, life expectancy, mental and physical 
abilities, habits, and disposition of the plaintiff, and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
4. The reasonable value of necessary services provided by 
another in doing things for the plaintiff, which, except the injury, 
the plaintiff would ordinarily have performed [and the present 
cash value of such services reasonably certain to be required in 
the future]; 
5. [Any other specific item based upon the evidence.] Whether the 
plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to 
decide. 
(emphasis added). Though not in the wrongful death setting, when differentiating between 
economic and non-economic damages in a standard negligence case, household services 
clearly falls under the category of economic damages. There is no logical reason why a 
distinction should be made in a wrongful death case. 
During trial, Jose Jr. and "Lupe" offered substantial testimony that their mother "did it 
all" referring to the household services. "Lupe" testified as to the toll her mother's death 
took on her both emotionally and financially. She articulated to the jury that after her 
mother died, she dropped out of school to move back in with her father and perform the 
household services that her mother used to provide. Not surprisingly, "Lupe" placed her 
own life on hold, sacrificing her own education, goals and aspirations to take responsibility 
for the loss incurred to the family for her mother's death and to care for Lorena and Alex, 
who had also lost their mom. The lost economic opportunities of graduating earlier, 
obtaining a salary earlier, and the additional transitional losses that are associated with 
leaving school, moving and forgoing an education to care for her family were undoubtedly a 
loss. I n essence, "Lupe" was compelled to be the "substitute domestic service" for her own 
mother at a great cost. 
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Significantly, Defendant Coonrod did not dispute, rebut or defend the fact that the 
loss of Maria Aguilar's services did not occur. The Defendant offered no evidence or 
testimony that the Aguilars did not sustain an economic loss for their mother's passing and 
did not object to the family's or Mr. Hofman's valuation of Maria Aguilars household 
services. 
b) Non-Economic Damages 
As to the non-economic damage aspect of the jury's award, the lack of sUbstance 
and logic of Coonrod's position is plainly apparent, and with good reason. Simply put, the 
verdict cannot be held as excessive given the legislature's own determination of what the 
cap on damages would be at the time of Maria Aguilar's death; in other words, application 
of the non-economic damage results in a legislative reduction of the non-economic 
damage awards for three of the five Aguilar Plaintiffs. It is non-sensical to reduce the non-
economic damage awards to the statutorily mandated cap, and then further find that the 
jury's verdict was excessive and otherwise a product of passion or prejudice. 
Most importantly, the extent of the Aguilar family's loss proven at trial is the best and 
most compelling evidence that the jury did not arrive at their verdict out of passion or 
prejudice. Four children lost their mother. A husband lost his wife. The fact that the jury 
awarded significantly different amounts for each of the Aguilar family reflects that it gave 
significant thought and consideration to the damage questions and reached its verdict 
based on the evidence rather than through passion or prejudice. 
5. Remitittur is Neither Appropriate nor Necessary. 
Defendants Coonrod and Primary Health urge the Court to issue a remitittur as an 
alternative to a new trial. However, the argument for remitittur is based on the 
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unsupportable contention that the jury verdict was excessive and otherwise unsupportable. 
Again, reduction of the non-economic damages to the statutory cap is a legislatively 
mandated remittitur and there is simply no legal or just basis for further reduction under the 
circumstances of this case. For the reasons stated in response to that argument, it is clear 
that there is no basis to issue a remitittur. 
6. Defendant's Motion for JNOV Must be Denied 
Defendant Coonrod and Primary Health argue that the Plaintiffs failed to lay a 
proper foundation for the testimony of their expert witnesses, Dr. Blaylock and Dr. LeBaron, 
and that a JNOV should thus issue. The Motion is based on the theory that neither Dr. 
Blaylock nor Dr. LeBaron had "actual knowledge" of the applicable standard of health care 
practice and thus should not have been allowed by the Court to testify at trial. 
Defendants acknowledge that under IRep 50(b), in making the motion, they admit 
the facts against them and that the Court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor 
of Plaintiffs. Defendants also acknowledge that the verdict must be upheld if there is 
evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have 
reached a similar conclusion to that reached by the jury. 
The Plaintiffs have previously briefed this issue and incorporate the bench brief filed 
with the Court on May 4, 2009 which sets forth the basis and manner in which Dr. LeBaron 
familiarized himself with the applicable standard of care. In that regard, and to summarize, 
Dr. LeBaron spoke to the only family practice physician who was willing to talk with him and 
as set forth in Mr. Foster's Affidavit, the Plaintiffs went to great lengths to locate a local 
qualifier. The Foster Affidavit is uncontested and unrefuted and it establishes, along with 
the testimony of Dr. LeBaron, that he was adequately qualified and had the sufficient 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A REMITTITUR, AND MOTION FOR JNOV -18 
3622 
foundation to testify at trial. This Court agreed when this matter was raised both before 
and during trial and it certainly should agree now. 
With regard to Dr. Blaylock, Plaintiffs' Eighth Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure sets forth the conversation between Dr. Roach and Dr. Blaylock which took 
place on November 13, 2008. That document was filed with the Court on November 17, 
2008. The Disclosure sets forth Dr. Blaylock's experience in working with and training 
family practice residents who ,he has hired to work in his urgent care center and those who 
he trained during their emergency medicine rotation at Emanuel and Washington Medical 
Centers in Portland, OR. This experience was the subject of testimony by Dr. Blaylock at 
trial. 
The disclosure ends with the following: 
"Dr. Blaylock and Dr. Roach agreed that the standard of health care practice 
for a family practitioner under these circumstances would not deviate 
between Nampa, Caldwell and Boise. Based upon what he learned in the 
conversation, Dr. Blaylock is of the opinion that the standard of health care 
practice for a family practitioner under the circumstances of this case did not 
deviate from the national or local standard of care practiced by the family 
practice physicians with whom he is familiar in Portland, Oregon." 
While Dr. Blaylock is a board certified Emergency Medicine physician, his 
qualifications to testify against Dr. Coonrod, a family practice physician, are set forth in his 
disclosure and his trial testimony. Regarding his qualifications to testify against Dr. 
Coonrod, in Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 757 P.2d 197 (1988); the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
"There is no requirement in these statutes that an expert whose testimony is 
offered to establish a case of medical malpractice against a board-certified 
physician must also be board certified in the same specialty. We specifically 
hold that to fulfill the requirement of presenting expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice case against a board-certified specialist, plaintiff may offer the 
testimony of a physician who is not board-certified in the same specialty as 
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the defendant physician, so long as the testimony complies with the 
requirements of I.C. sections 6-1012 and 6-1013." Pearson, supra at page 
337. 
As Dr. Blaylock was fully qualified under those statutes to render testimony against 
Defendant Coonrod by virtue of the background, training, education and experience to 
which he testified at trial, and since he spoke to a local qualifying physician, Dr. Roach, his 
testimony was properly admitted. 
Defendants cite to three Idaho cases to support their position that neither Dr. 
Blaylock nor Dr. LeBaron had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care. 
However, a review of those three cases indicates that they do not support Defendant's 
position. 
First, Defendant Coonrod cites Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,775 P.2d 106 (1989) 
for the proposition that a testifying expert in a medical malpractice case must have actual 
knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. This idea is nothing new and 
is one of the reasons Plaintiffs herein sent letters to every family practice physician in 
Nampa, Caldwell, Weiser and Payette trying to locate a family practice physician willing to 
speak to Drs. Blaylock and LeBaron. Only one such physician could be located and so 
Plaintiffs utilized him to qualify their family practice experts. Contrast Plaintiffs' efforts 
herein with what the plaintiffs in Strode did to qualify their expert. In Strode, it was argued 
by plaintiffs that their proposed expert did not have to talk to an Idaho physician because 
he was board certified in the same specialty as the defendant physician. In other words, 
the Strode Plaintiffs did not do what the Idaho statutes and case law indicate must be done 
in order to lay a foundation for an expert's qualifications to testify regarding a breach of the 
standard of care. Thus, Strode's expert could not testify. Conversely, the Plaintiffs 
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statutory requirements. 
Defendants also cite Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 795 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1990). 
In that case, the plaintiffs' expert actually stated in his deposition that he was not familiar 
with the local standard of care in Twin Falls. Plaintiffs then attempted to qualify their expert 
using an argument that since both the expert and the defendant physician referred to the 
same medical text as a basis for the standard treatment at issue in the litigation, the expert 
was qualified. This tactic, of course, did not work. Kunz thus merely stands for the 
proposition that I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 require the expert witness to possess 
professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care. Here, Plaintiffs went to extraordinary lengths to qualify their experts. The 
facts of Kunz do not support Defendant Coonrod's argument. 
The third case cited by Defendant Coonrod is Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 
868 P.2d 1224 (1994). In Rhodehouse, the Supreme Court did not even getto the issue of 
whether the plaintiffs' expert was qualified to give an opinion under I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013 because the District Court had found that the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert did not meet 
the requirements for admissibility under IRCP 56(e). The expert, in his affidavit, had stated 
a legal conclusion that he was familiar with the applicable standard of care without 
indicating how he had gained such familiarity. The Supreme Court affirmed on that basis 
alone without reaching the questions presented by I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Thus, 
Rhodehouse is of no assistance to Defendant Coonrod because both the expert witness 
disclosures and the trial testimony of Drs. Blaylock and LeBaron fully set forth the manner 
and methodology by which they became familiar with the standard of care. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, there is no legal nor just basis for post trial relief. 
Defendant Coonrod's Motion for New Trial, Motion for Remittur and or Motion for JNOV 
must all be denied. 
IIi l~ 
DATED This -D day of June, 2009. 
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submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their Objection to the Judgment upon the 
Verdict and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Nathan Coonrod. M.D. and Primary Health Care Center (hereinafter referred to as 
"defendants") respectfully object to the Court's entry of judgment upon the verdict dated 
May 20, 2009, on the basis it contravenes the statutory language of Idaho Code §6w 
1603. This section clearly states there can be only one cap applied, no matter the number 
of heirs. 
Defendants request this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to 
alter or amend the judgment by reducing the non-economic damages portion of the 
judgment against defendants to $682,200.65, total. Specifically, defendants request this 
Court apply the statutory non-economic damages cap to aI/listed plaintiffs collectively so 
there is only one non-economic damages award for all plaintiffs in the amount of 
$682,200.65. the amount of the non-economic damages cap applicable to this matter. 
I. 
IDAHO CODe §6 .. 1603 IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS; A SINGLE CAP 
APPLIES COLLECTIVELY TO ALL PLAINTIFFS 
Defendants respectfully submit a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, 
pursuant to Rule 59 (e) is appropriate in the above-entitled case in order to correct the 
non-economic damages award rendered by the jury against the defendants. Rule 59 (e) 
functions to provide the trial court a mechanism to correct legal and factual errors 
occurring in proceedings before it, before it reaches the appellate level. Slaathaug v. 
Allstate Insurance Company, 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999). 
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As the Court is aware, plaintiffs initiated a wrongful ,death cause of action against 
defendants alleging negligence and medical malpractice. After a jury trial, the jury 
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants, which included both 
economic and non-economic damages. The jury awarded $700,000 in economic 
damages in favor of the plaintiffs collectively. However, the jury awarded $3,500,000 in 
non-economic damages total, with a separate and individual award to each listed 
plaintiff. On May 20, 2009, this Court entered judgment upon the verdict in favor of 
plaintiffs, adopting the jury's awards for non-economic damages as follows: Jose 
Aguilar: $903,000; Jose Aguilar, Jr.: $485,000; Guadalupe Maria Aguilar: $725,000; 
Alejandro Aguilar: $602,000; and Lorena Aguilar: $785,000. 
Defendants object to the Court's entry of judgment upon the verdict and submits 
this Court must determine whether the total non-economic damages award for the 
plaintiffs exceeds the statutory cap for non-economic damages. 
Defendants submit Idaho Code § 6-1603 is clear and unambiguous, and its 
words must be given their plain meaning. Kelso & Irwin, PA v. State Ins. Fund, 134 
Idaho 130, 134,997 P.2d 591 (2000). Rim View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 
823, 828 P2d 848 (1992). D & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 
Idaho 160, 164-65,59 P.3d 965 (2002). Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 
Idaho 244. 246, 61 P.3d 601 (2002). 
According to Idaho Code § 6-1603, no judgment shalf be entered exceeding the 
amount of the cap. I.C. § 6-1603. The judgment in this matter, most certainly, does 
exceed the applicable cap. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1603, it must be 
reduced. 
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Moreover, per the language of the statute, the claimants in this wrongful death 
case constitute a single plaintiff within the meaning of § 6-1603. Therefore, the Court 
must apply the statutory non~economic damages cap to aI/ listed plaintiffs col/ectively so 
there is only one non-economic damages award for all plaintiffs. 
In order to correctly apply the non~economic damages cap to the above-entitled 
case, the Court must analyze both the wrongful death statute and the cap statute. Idaho 
Code § 5-311, allowing wrongful death causes of action, reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may 
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death ... 
whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured .. 
. . In every action under this section, such damages may be given as under 
a/l the circumstances of the case as may be just. 
I.C. § 5-311 (emphasis added). 
The language of this statute shows the Idaho Legislature contemplated only a 
single "action." The pre-July 1, 2003, version of Idaho Code § 6-1603 pertaining to the 
limitation or statutory cap on non-economic damages states, in relevant part: 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death. 
shall a judgment for noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant 
exceeding the maximum amount of four hundred thousand dollars 
($400,000); provided. however, that beginning on July 1, 1988, and each 
July 1 thereafter, the cap on noneconomic damages established in this 
section shall increase or decrease in accordance with the percentage 
amount of increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial commission 
adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to section 72-
409(2), Idaho Code. 
(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: (a) 
noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal 
injury or who is asserting a wrongful death; (b) noneconomic damages 
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sustained by a craimant, regardless of the number of persons 
responsible for the damages the number of actions filed. 
I.C. § 6-1603 (2003) (emphasis added). 
The language of Idaho Code § 6-1603 (2003) is unambiguous and the Court 
should give the statutory language its plain, obvious and rational meaning. In an action 
seeking damages in wrongful death, Idaho Code § 6-1603(2) requires the application of 
the non-economic damages cap collectively, "regardless of ... the number of actions 
filed." It does not matter whether five plaintiffs file a collective wrongful death suit -- as 
the Aguilar family did in the present case -- or whether five plaintiffs file five individual 
and separate wrongful death actions. The result is the same. Whether the claims are 
filed together or separately, Idaho Code § 6-1603(2) only allows one cap, which is to be 
applied, no matter the number of claimants. The cap of $682,200.65 is the total that 
can be awarded against the defendants. In other words, this is the total amount 
available to all plaintiffs, collectively. 
A former Idaho Supreme Court Justice and current United States Magistrate for 
the District of Idaho has ruled the statutory cap on non-economic damages, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 6-1603, applies to al/ plaintiffs collectively, and not to each plaintiff 
individually, in a wrongful death cause of action. 
In Clarendon National Insurance Company v. Phillips, 2005 WL 1041479 (D. 
Idaho), then United States Chief Magistrate, the Honorable Larry M. Boyle, addressed 
the issue of whether the cap applies collectively or individually to the three plaintiffs who 
brought a wrongful death cause of action. He also addressed whether the plaintiffs' 
collective non-economic damages cap is $250,000 or a combined $750,000. Id. Judge 
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Boyle determined the language of I.C. § 6-1603 is unambiguous and applied the 
statute's plain meaning. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Boyle concluded I.C. § 6-1603(2) 
requires the application of the cap collectively, regardless of the number of plaintiffs. Id. 
Judge Boyle stated that to conclude otherwise "would strip the purpose and policy from 
the Idaho State Legislature's intent." Id. 
Moreover, Judge Boyle concluded adoption of the plaintiffs' argument (i.e. to 
apply the cap to each individual plaintiff, rather than collectively), and to carry it to its 
logical extension would suggest that a decedent with ten siblings and two parents could 
possibly have a total cap of $3 million dollars, while a decedent with one parent and no 
siblings would be limited to a recovery of only $250,000 (the applicable cap at the time 
of Clarendon v. Philligs). Id. Judge Boyle stated, "[s]uch a paradoxical effect is not in 
harmony with the Idaho Legislature's clear intent to limit to $250,000 the non-economic 
damages cap regardless of the 'number of actions filed.'" Id. 
Judge Boyle legally concluded and held no matter whether three parties file a 
collective wrongful death action, or whether three family members file three individual 
and separate wrongful death suits, Idaho Code § 6-1603(2) applies the total non-
economic damages cap to all plaintiffs col/ectively in a wrongful death action, rather 
than to each individual plaintiff. rd. Therefore. Judge Boyle applied the applicable non-
economic damages cap of $250,000 to all three plaintiffs collectively in the wrongful 
death cause of action. Id. 
Plaintiffs rely upon Horner v. Sani-ToD. Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099 
(2006), to support their position that Idaho Code § 6-1603 must apply the non-economic 
damages cap to each plaintiff individually. However, plaintiffs' reliance upon Homer is 
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misplaced. In Horner, the Idaho Supreme Court never specifically addressed or ruled 
upon the issue of whether the non-economic damages cap applies to each plaintiff 
individually or to all plaintiffs collectively in a wrongful death action. 
In Horner, the real issue was whether the award of non-economic damages 
should be reduced first due to the cap, or first due to the comparative negligence of 
other parties. The Horner court also addressed whether the district court correctly 
calculated the non-economic damages award when applying the cap and whether the 
district court should have considered out-of-court settlements in calculating the cap for 
non-economic damages The trial court chos~ to reduce the non-economic damages 
award first via the use of Idaho's comparative negligence scheme. Id. 143 Idaho at 234-
235, 141 P.3d at 1103-1104. The result was the total non-economic damages award 
was less than the cap. Id. Therefore, there was no reason for defendants to argue the 
issue of whether the cap applied collectively or individually, because collectively, the 
amount of non-economic damages did not surpass the cap. lQ.. 143 Idaho at 235, 141 
P.3d at 1104. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Horner, was never asked to address 
whether multiple heirs/plaintiffs in a wrongful death cause of action constitute one 
"party" or one uclaimant." It simply was not an issue raised on appeal. More importantly, 
it was not an issue that needed to be raised below or on appeal, since the combined 
non-economic damages awarded to the three plaintiffs totaled only $520,000, at the 
most, which is less than the cap calculated to be applicable by the trial court.1 Thus, the 
1 According to the Homer opinion, the mother and father of the deceased child were each awarded 
$195,000 in non-economic damages. The sister of the deceased was awarded $130,000, but the opinion 
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Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the cap applies to each 
plaintiff individually or to all plaintiffs collectively in a wrongful death action. 
Likewise, plaintiffs' reliance on various district court decisions are not controlling 
precedent and are distinguishable from the issues presented in the above-entitled case. 
In Stanger v. CRST International, CV 02-1003 (March 2005). Judge Butler did not 
specifically address the derivative nature of the wrongful death cause of action as it 
pertains to application of the non-economic damages cap, as discussed by the 
defendants, below. In Couch v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Case No. CV PI 
99-00-0289 (February 2001), Judge Sticklen also failed to address the derivative nature 
of the wrongful death cause of action in Idaho as it pertains to application of the non-
economic damages cap, as discussed, below. 
In Vollmer v. Snake River School District, Judge Herndon also relied upon the 
analysis of Homer v. Sani-Top, Inc., which, as discussed, supra, does not address the 
specific issue presented in the above-entitled case. In Jones, et al v. Anesthesia 
ConSUltants of Treasure Valley, et ai, CV PI 0400486 (November 2006), Judge Wi/per 
also did not address the specific issue presented in this case. Thus, these district court 
decisions are not controlling precedent and are distinguishable from the issues 
presented in the case at bar. 
Finally, plaintiffs rely upon a Tort Claims Act statute, Idaho Code §6-926. This 
statute deals with the availability of insurance proceeds, and limits the liability of a 
governmental entity to $500,000, or the limits of any applicable insurance policy. I.e. 
does not indIcate whether this amount was for economic or non-economic damages. However, even 
assuming the $130,000 was all non-economIc damages, the sum of the two three awards equals only 
$520,000, well below the $691,262.14 calculated by the trial court to be the applicable cap. Id. 143 Idaho 
at 233~235, 141 P .3d at 1102-1104. 
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§6-926. However, it cannot be used as support for plaintiffs' position, as it clearly was 
intended to cover situations involving multiple separate plaintiffs - as in a situation 
wherein a county vehicle crashes into a van, injuring andlor killing multiple occupants. 
In that situation, there would be an aggregate cap, versus a single cap, because all 
potential damages would be limited, not just non-economic damages, from one single 
occurrence. Therefore, this statute cannot be used as a comparison to Idaho Code §6-
1603. 
It is defendants' position Idaho Code § 6-1603 is unambiguous. Clearly, the plain 
meaning of the statute shows there can only be one cap. There cannot be multiple 
caps, as the clear and unambiguous language of the statute allows for only one cap, 
collectively, no matter the number of claimants. 
II. 
EVEN IF THIS COURT DEEMS IDAHO CODE §6-1603 TO BE AMBIGUOUS, IT (S 
CLEAR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT SUPPORTS ONE COLLECTIVE CAP ON NON .. 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
It is defendants' position Idaho Code § 6-1603 is clear and unambiguous. 
However, even if the Court determines Idaho Code § 6-1603 is ambiguous, as argued 
by plaintiffs, the intent of the Idaho Legislature still shows the Court should apply the 
cap collectively to all plaintiffs, rather than to each individual plaintiff. 
"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction." Inama v. Boise County, 138 Idaho 324,329,63 P.3d 450,455 
(2003). "If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended for it to mean." Jd. In order to determine the intent of the legislature, 
the courts examine not only the literal words of the statute, "but also the 
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reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history." Id. 
Plaintiffs argue since Idaho Code § 6-1601(2) defines "claimant" as "any party to 
a civil action making a claim for relief, legal or equitable, compensatory or 
noncompensatory," an ambiguity arises as to who is "any party" when the non-
economic damages cap statute in I.C. § 6-1603 is applied to a wrongful death case. 
Plaintiffs argue "any party" is an individual plaintiff. However, in the case at bar, this 
definition cannot be read in a vacuum. Pursuant to Idaho's wrongful death statute, 
multiple heirs (or personal representatives on behalf of the heirs) may only "maintain an 
action" against the person causing the death of the decedent. Such heirs, col/ectively, are. 
a singular "party" for purposes of bringing a wrongful death action. Therefore, the multiple 
plaintiffs/heirs are "a claimant" for purposes of applying the non-economic damages cap to 
a wrongful death case. 
Furthermore, wrongful death causes of action are derivative in nature to the heirs of 
the decedent. See Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 793 P.2d 711 (1990). A 
wrongful death action "is allowed upon the theory that the wrongful death of the ancestor 
works a personal injury to his heirs, in that it deprives them of some pecuniary or other 
benefit which they would have received except for the death of the ancestor." Bevan v. 
Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 1041-42, 793 P.2d 711, 714-15 (1990) (quoting 
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 538,148 P.2d 221 (1944». However, heirs claim under the 
decedent, and a wrongful death action "arises out of the same state of facts, whether 
prosecuted by the injured party during his lifetime or by his heirs after his death." Id., 117 
Idaho at 1042, 793 P.2d at 715 (quoting Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho at 538, 148 P.2d at 222); 
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see also Northern Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440, 450, 24 S.ct. 408, 409, 48 L.Ed. 513 
(1904); Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957 (1934). 
Plaintiffs in a wrongful death cause of action, as heirs of the decedent, cannot 
recover damages unless the decedent could have recovered damages for his injuries had 
he or she survived. Anderson v. Gailey. 97 Idaho 813,822,555 P.2d 144, 153 (1976). "If 
the decedent's negligence would have barred his recovery against the defendant for 
injuries had he survived, then the decedent's heirs are barred from recovery in a wrongful 
death action." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has further stated: 
It is true that I.C. 5-311 does not contain the proviso common to most 
wrongful death statutes aI/owing the heirs to maintain an action for wrongful 
death only, Whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the person 
injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued: However, for sixty 
years this jurisdiction and other have uniformly held that the statute should 
be interpreted as if it contained the above qualification. 
Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 144,391 P.2d 853, 859 (1964). 
In Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., supra, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
whether a decedent's comparative negligence could bar recovery for damages to the 
decedent's heirs in a wrongful death cause of action. Bevan v. Vassar Farms. Inc., 117 
Idaho at 1042, 793 P.2d at 715. The Court followed well~established and long standing 
precedent in Idaho construing the wrongful death statute and comparative negligence 
statute, and held: 
[P]laintiffs can recover for wrongful death only when the wrongful act would 
have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if death had not 
ensued. Thus, if the decedent's negligence was not as great as that of the 
defendants, then decedent's heirs would be entitled to recover for their loss 
reduced by the percentage of decedent's negligence. However, where the 
decedent's negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's 
negligence, then the decedent's heirs are barred from recovery as would be 
the injured party had he survived. 
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kt; see also Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813,822,555 P.2d 144,153 (1976); Fairchild v. 
Olsen, 96 Idaho 338,528 P.2d 900 (1974); Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 144,391 P.2d 
853,859 (1964); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651 (1950); Russell v. 
Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 538, 148 P.2d 221 (1944); Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 
957 (1934); Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928). 
In Woodburn v. Manco, 137 Idaho 502, 50 P.3d 997 (2002), the plaintiffs argued 
the wrongful death statute was enacted ,to allow an heir to recover for his or her own 
damages suffered by the death of a relative (Le. decedent), and these damages are 
separate from the injuries (and damages) suffered by the decedent. Woodburn v. Manco, 
137 Idaho 502, 506, 50 P.3d 997, 1001 (2002). The plaintiffs argued the claimed wrongful 
death damages were derivative only in the sense such damages would not have been 
incurred but for the death of the decedent. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiffs' assertion was true, but also 
stated, "it is only a partial statement of the law. The derivative nature of a wrongful death 
claim bars recovery by the plaintiff if the negligence of the decedent is as great as or 
greater than that of the defendant." Id. The Court upheld its prior rulings, by affirming the 
requirement of the wrongful death and comparative negligence statutes to aggregate or 
impute the negligence of the decedent to the plaintiff heirs. 19.:., 137 Idaho at 507,50 P.3d 
at 1002. 
At least one other jurisdiction has addressed this very issue and ruled the right of 
the heirs to collect damages in a wrongful death case does not arise from a separate tort, 
but instead wholly derive from the injury suffered by the decedent. The Colorado Supreme 
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Court, in Steedle, MD v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2007), ruled: 'Whether an 
individual heir suffers actual damages is irrelevant; unlike a loss of consortium claim that 
requires proof of personal damages, a wrongful death action involves a shared injury 
among survivors such that there is no individualized recovery of damages. A wrongful 
death action is one that is possessed, collectively, by the heirs at law of the decedent.'" Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
Defendants submit this reasoning from the Idaho and Colorado Supreme Courts is 
accurate. The plaintiffs/heirs in the present wrongful death cause of action, are dependent 
upon the right of action which the decedent, Maria Aguilia r, would have had, had the 
decedent survived her injuries. The plaintiffs wholly derive their claims and damages from 
the injuries suffered by Maria Aguilar. Since plaintiffs' wrongful death action involves a 
shared injury among the surviving helrs {derived from Maria Aguilar's injury}, then the 
individual plaintiffs do not possess separate, individualized damages flowing to each 
plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiffs, in this wrongful death action, as heirs to Maria Aguilar, 
possess one set of damages, collectively, which derive from the injuries and claims Maria 
Aguilar could have recovered for damages had she survived. See Anderson v. Gailey, 97 
Idaho 813, 822, 555 P.2d 144, 153 (1976). 
Based upon the analysis, supra, of Idaho's wrongful death statute, the plaintiffs are 
"a party" deriving their cause of action, and subsequent damages, from the cause of action 
Maria Aguilar could have maintained had she survived. Therefore, the term "claimanf' in 
Idaho Code § 6-1603, and as defined by Idaho Code § 6-1601(2), when read in 
conjunction with Idaho's wrongful death statute, clearly must be interpreted as a "party" 
consisting of multiple plaintiffs/heirs in a wrongful death cause of action. Since the 
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plaintiffs' in the present wrongful death action are one "c1aimant," deriving their cause of 
action, and subsequent damages, from Maria Aguilar's injuries, the non"economic 
damages cap applies collectively to all plaintiffs. The Court must apply the cap to reduce 
the award for non"economic damages to $682,200.65 total for all plaintiffs collectively. 
In addition, '~[whJen the [I]egislature passes a statute, it is presumed to be aware 
of existing statutes." Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cou,nty, 104 Idaho 833, 839, 663 
P.2d 1135, 1141 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing First American Title Co. of Idaho, Inc. v. Clark, 
99 Idaho 10, 576 P.2d 581 (1978». At the time the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho 
Code § 6-1603, it was aware that the wrongful death statute identified those persons 
entitled to sue and recover damages for a wrongful death, namely heirs and personal 
representatives, and that such heirs or the heirs' personal representatives may maintain 
one action for damages against the person causing the death. See I.C. § 5-311. 
Specifically, Idaho's wrongful death statute provides that ~ny one plaintiff (Le. anyone 
of the decedent's heirs or heirs' personal representatives) can initiate and maintain a 
wrongful death cause of action and recover such damages without the joinder of any 
other person entitled to maintain such lawsuit or recover such damages. I.C. § 5-311. 
Consequently, knowing that the wrongful death statute creates a cause of action 
enforceable by one or more persons (i.e. one or more heirs of the decedent), the Idaho 
Legislature has declined thus far to increase the non-economic damages cap where 
more than one person, or "claimant," brings a wrongful death cause of action. See I.C. § 
6-1603. 
Moreover, in interpreting the plain statutory language of Idaho Code § 6-1603, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the language "regardless of the number of persons 
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responsible for the damages or the number of actions filedll simply means that 
"regardless of how many defendants are listed on the verdict form or how many actions 
the plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, a judgment cannot be entered in favor 
of 'a claimant' that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap." Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 
143 Idaho at 234-235, 141 P .3d at 1103-11 04 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, in reading Idaho Code § 5-311 and Idaho Code § 6-1603 together, it 
is necessary to conclude that "heirs or personal representatives on their behalf' are a 
single "claimant" for purposes of applying the non-economic damages cap to a wrongful 
death cause of action. In a wrongful death cause of action, multiple plaintiffs are subject 
to one non-economic damages cap collectively, rather than individually, because they 
are "a claimant" as defined by Idaho Code § 6-1603. 
III. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT ONE SINGLE CAP IN WRONGFUL DEATH 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
Defendants' position that the cap on non-economic damages is applied 
collectively to all plaintiffs in a wrongful death suit is supported by the public policy 
considerations that led to the original adoptions of the cap. 
On the other hand, the application of the non-economic damages cap to each 
individual and separate plaintiff in a wrongful death cause of action does not further nor 
comport with the stated legislative goal of addressing concerns of large civil jury 
verdicts driving up the cost of liability insurance. If this Court adopts plaintiffs' argument 
that the non-economic damages cap applied to each plaintiff separately and 
individually, and carried the plaintiffs' reasoning to its logical conclusion, then such 
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reasoning would suggest that a decedent with ten (10) siblings and two (2) parents 
could possibly have a total cap of $8,186,407.80 (applying pre-July 1, 2003 cap of 
$682,200.65), while a decedent with one (1) parent and no siblings would be limited to a 
recovery of only $682,200.65 (pre-July 1,2003 cap). 
Such a paradoxical effect does not comport with the Idaho Legislature's clear 
intent to limit the non-economic damages to the statutory cap regardless of the "number 
of actions filed." As stated previously, whether five plaintiffs file a collective wrongful 
death suit as the Aguilar family did in the present case or whether five plaintiffs filed five 
individual and separate wrongful death actions, does not ch~nge the legal conclusion 
that I.C. § 6-1603(2) applies the total $682,200.65 non-economic damages cap for a 
wrongful death action to all plaintiffs collectively. Therefore, this Court must apply the 
applicable non-economic damages cap to the plaintiffs collectively, and not individually. 
If the Court concludes otherwise, then such a determination would strip the purpose and 
policy from the Idaho Legislature's intent of limiting the cost of liability insurance. 
Plaintiffs refer to I.C. § 6-1603's legislative history to support their "per claimanf' 
analysis, and rely upon alleged testimony made by Kenneth R. McClure that in the case 
of wrongful death, each claimant gets up to $250,000. See Hearing on H.B. No. 92, 
Before the Senate Jud. and Rules Comm., March 3, 2003, pp. 1-2. However, plaintiffs 
refer to the minutes taken at the hearing, and do not cite an actual transcript of the 
hearing to provide the specific testimony allegedly provided by Mr. McClure. 
Mr. McClure was not an elected Idaho legislator at the time of the hearing, but 
rather a lobbyist and proponent of tort reform, and according to the minutes of said 
hearing, no elected legislator made any statements as to the legislative intent of the 
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language in Idaho Code § 6-1603. Unless such language is present in transcripts of the 
March 3, 2003, hearing. or any other legislative hearing regarding Idaho Code § 6-1603, 
these alleged statements cannot be verified. Also, several jurisdictions have previously 
ruled the statements made by a lobbyist are not competent to be used to determine 
legislative intent. See e.g., Murphy v. Nilsen, 527 P.2d 736, 738 (Ct.App. Ore. 1974); 
Flake v. Bennett, 156 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Iowa 1968). 
Further, a close review of these minutes reveals there are errors within this 
document. For instance, the next line after the language of the minutes relied upon by 
plaintiffs states Mr. McClure said: "This cap is constitutional and violates the right to a 
jury trial." See March 3, 2003, Minutes Hearing on H.B, No. 92, Before the Senate JUd. 
And Rules Committee, attached as Exhibit A to the Foster Affidavit. Assuredly, this is 
not what Mr. McClure stated to the legislative committee. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted, within that portion of the minutes highlighted via 
underline by plaintiffs, there is no definition of what Mr. McClure means by stating 
"each." It is reasonable to interpret Mr. McClure was referring to "each" as in 
"each set of heirs" or "each set of survivors" in a wrongful death case. This would 
support defendants' position that the cap is for each set of survivors, not each individual 
survivor. 
It is clear from the legislative history of I.C. § 6-1603, and cannot be disputed, 
that the Idaho Legislature passed LC. § 6-1603 "as part of a larger legislative package 
aimed at addressing concerns that large civil jury verdicts were driving up the cost 
of liability insurance." Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464,470, 
4 P.3d 1115. 1121 (2000) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court added: 
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As part of the bill which included I.C. § 6-1603, the legislature also 
included reforms to the liability insurance business so Idaho policyholders 
would have more control over the prices and conditions of liability 
insurance; legislation designed to encourage settlements by giving 
defendants additional incentive to settle and by giving the courts greater 
latitude to impose sanctions on those bringing frivolous lawsuits; and 
some limitations on the application of joint and several liability. 
Id. (See Act of April 1, 1987, ch. 278, 1987 Idaho Session Laws 571). 
The Court further stated that "(b)y striking this balance between a tort victim's 
right to recover noneconomic damages and society's interest in preserving the 
availability of affordable liability insurance, the legislature 'is engaging in its fundamental 
and legitimate role of structuring and accommodating the burdens and benefits of 
economic life.'" Id. (quoting Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 
1996». Therefore, this Court must apply the applicable non-economic damages cap to 
the plaintiffs collectively, and not individually. If this Court concludes otherwise, then 
such a determination would strip the purpose and policy from the Idaho Legislature's 
intent of limiting the cost of liability insurance. 
IV. 
CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE CAP. COLLECTIVELY, DOES NOT RAISE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Finally. defendants submit plaintiffs' attempt to interject constitutional arguments 
into this debate must fail. Plaintiffs argue application of the non-economic damages cap 
collectively, rather than individually, creates impermissible constitutional conflict with the 
Idaho Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and proscription against special 
legislation. Plaintiffs argue the Court must apply the cap to each individual plaintiff, 
rather than collectively. 
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Plaintiffs' constitutional arguments fail because applying the non-economic 
damages cap collectively, to all plaintiffs, does not raise constitutional Issues. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has already held Idaho Code § 6-1603 does not 
constitute special legislation. U[A] legis/ative enactment is not special legislation when it 
treats all persons in similar situations alike." Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 
134 Idaho at 469, 4 P.3d at 1120. As stated previously, the Idaho Supreme Court 
referenced the legislative history of Idaho Code § 6-1603, stating, in pertinent part: 
[f]he statute was passed as part of a larger legislative package aimed at 
addressing concerns that large civil jury verdicts were driving up the cost 
of liability insurance. As part of the bill which included I.C. § 6-1603, the 
legislature also included reforms to the liability insurance business so 
Idaho policyholders would have more control over the prices and 
conditions of liability insurance; legislation designed to encourage 
settlements by giving defendants additional incentive to settle and by 
giving the courts greater latitude to impose sanctions on those bringing 
frivolous lawsuits; and some limitations on the application of joint and 
several liability. By striking this balance between a tort victim's right to 
recover noneconomic damages and society's interest in preserving the 
availability of affordable liability- insurance, the legislature 'is engaging in 
its fundamental and legitimate role of structuring and accommodating the 
burdens and benefits of economic life.' 
Id., 13 Idaho at 470.4 P.3d at 1121 (internal citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court held the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the 
availability of insurance for Idaho citizens, and specifically ruled Idaho Code § 6-1603 
did not violate the constitutional prohibition against special legislation because it is 
neither an arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable method to address the legitimate 
societal concern of affordable insurance. Therefore, plaintiffs' allegation that applying 
the statutory cap on non-economic damages collectively is special legislation lacks 
merit. 
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Plaintiffs' argument that application of the statutory cap collectively violates the 
Equal Protection Clause also fails. Plaintiffs argue applying the non-economic damages 
cap collectively would treat the death of a wife who leaves only a surviving spouse to 
claim the $250,000 cap differently and unequal in value to the death of a wife who 
leaves a surviving spouse and minor children. 
However, this logic fails because applying the statutory cap to each plaintiff 
individually, as requested by plaintiffs, creates the same al/eged, equal protection 
problem. For example, if the Court carried the plaintiffs'reasoning to its logical 
conclusion, then a decedent with ten (10) siblings and two (2) parents could possibly 
have a total cap of $8,186,407.80 in non-economic damages (applying pre-July 1, 2003 
cap of $682,200.65), and thus, would be treated differently and unequally from a 
decedent with one (1) parent and no siblings would receive omy $682,200.65 (pre-July 
1, 2003 cap) in non-economic damages. 
In a wrongful death case, application of the non-economic damages cap to all 
plaintiffs collectively does not create impermissible equal protection problems because 
the cap treats the same class of persons (i.e. heirs to a decedent) equally, regardless of 
the number of heirs, by providing the same amount of non-economic damages to each 
estate (Le. the capped amount of non-economic damages). Therefore, no equal 
protection issue arises by applying the non-economic damages cap collectively, rather 
than individually, to all plaintiffs in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), defendants respectfully object to the Judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict dated May 20, 2009, on the basis it contravenes the statutory 
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language of Idaho Code §6-1603 and mandated application of the statutory non-
economic damages cap to wrongful death cases. Also, defendants respectfully request 
this Court grant their motion to alter or amend the judgment by reducing the non-economic 
damages portion of the judgment against defendants to $682,200.65, total, for all 
plaintiffs, which represents a single cap, in the amount applicable at the time the above-
entitled wrongful death cause of action arose in June 2003. Specifically, defendants 
request this Court apply the statutory non-economic damages cap to the listed plaintiffs 
collectively so there is only one non-economic damages award against defendants in the 
amount of $682,200.65. 
For the reasons stated herein, defendants respectfully request the Court grant 
their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment to Apply the Statutory Cap on Non-
Economic Damages to All Plaintiffs Col/ectively. 
Lla~ 
DATED thisZLday of June, 2009. 
TOLMAN~IZEE' P.C. 
Sy: -=-St-:-e-v-en-+-'K~. T=-o-:'l-m""-a-n"""---60 .... -r------:::--
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Attorney for Defendant Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care Center 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE 




ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
more of the Defendants, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 05-57B 1 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT FOR 
REMITTITUR, AND MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
COME NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center by and through their attorney of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and respectfully 
;; 
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submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for New Trial, or in the 
Alternative Motion to Amend Judgment for a Remittitur of Damages, and Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center (hereinafter referred to as 
"defendants") respectfully requests this Court grant a new trial, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure (lRCP) 59{a), or in the alternative, if a new trial is denied, defendants 
respectfully request an amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of economic 
damages be entered, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 59.1, 
reducing the amount of economic damages in this case to $244,847, Or another amount. 
deemed reasonable and appropriate by this Court. 
Defendants also respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50 (b). for judgment· notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence 
presented at trial was not of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could have reached the same conclusion as the jury in the. above-entitled case. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
1. The Court's refusal to allow defendants to present evidence through 
plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock. M.D., regarding the non-party 
negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes abuse of discretion and/or 
error in law occurring at the trial and which prevented defendants from 
having a fair triar. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this matter, pursuant to 
(RCP 59(a)(1) andlor (7), is appropriate on the basis the Court's refusal to allow 
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defendants to present evidence through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., 
regarding the non-party negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes an abuse of 
discretion andlor an error in law which prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
In accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6-801 and 6-802, and pursuant to the Idaho 
appellate authority, all actors, including non-parties, whose negligent conduct caused or 
contributed to the subject occurrence and resulting damages claimed by plaintiffs must 
be included on the special verdict form. Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Company, 111 Idaho 
536, 542, 726 P.2d 648, 654 (1985). In Pocatello Industrial Park Company v. Steel 
West. Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court expressly 
approved the inclusion of non-parties on the special verdict form: 
It is established without a doubt that, when apportioning negligence a jury 
must have the opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the 
transaction, whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or 
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other tortfeasors either by 
operation of law or because of a prior release. The reason for such (a 
rule) is that true apportionment cannot be achieved unless that 
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guiltv of causal negligence either 
causing or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether or not they 
are parties to the case. 
Id., 101 Idaho at 787, 671 P.2d at 403 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated "true apportionment cannot be achieved unless 
[the jury verdict form] includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either causing 
or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are parties to the 
case." Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 205 P.3d 660, 667 (2009) (quoting Van Brunt 
v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 687, 39 P.3d 621, 627 (2001». 
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Pursuant to the application of Idaho Code § 6-801, and in accordance with Idaho 
appellate authority, non-parties are required to be included on the jury verdict fonn upon 
the presentation of evidence of their failure to exercise ordinary care to protect plaintiff 
from harm and injury, breach of any applicable standard of health care practice (in the 
instance of health care providers), any statutory violation(s}, and/or failure to perform 
statutory duties, which faiJure(s) and/or violation(s) caused or contributed to the subject 
incident and the injuries or damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff. Munns v. Swift 
Transportation Co .• Inc., 138 Idaho 108, 112,58 P.3d 92, 96 (2002). 
Moreover, Idaho Code Section 6-1012 provides the requirements that defendants 
were to satisfy, as part of their defense, to establish negligence at trial against any non-
party or non-parties, including Dr. Long and/or Dr. Chai, in the above-entitled case. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1012 states, in relevant part: 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any 
person, brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of 
health care ... such claimant or plaintiff must, as an essential part of his 
or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by 
a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such defendant then 
and there negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care 
practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should 
have been provided .... 
I.C. § 6-1012. Defendants were required to present as part of their defense, by direct 
expert testimony, and in accordance with the elements of Idaho Code Section 6-1012, 
that certain non-parties breached the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community and that there was a causal connection between the breach of care of the 
non-parties and the death of the Maria Aguilar in this case. See Jones v. Crawforth, 147 
Idaho 11 , 205 P .3d at 668. 
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To accomplish this, defendants were required to call an expert witness and 
intended to utilize plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., to show that non-
parties were negligent in the above-entitled case. Specifically, defendants tried to call 
Dr. Blaylock to establish the negligence of the non-parties in this case; however, this 
Court refused to allow defendants to call Dr. Blaylock in establishing their defense. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that no party to litigation has "anything 
resembling a proprietary right" to any witness evidence. Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, 
Inc., 186 N.J. 286. 301,895 A.2d 405, 413-414 (2006). "Absent a privilege no party is 
entitled to restrict an opponenfs access to a witness, however partial or important to 
him. by insisting on some notion of allegiance. Even an expert whose knowledge has 
been purchased cannot be silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground 
alone." Id. at ,301, 414. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Also. "[b]y declaring that 
an expert witness will be produced at trial and providing the expert's identity and opinion 
to another party, as required by [the local discovery rules], the original proponent has 
waived his claim that the information is privileged. Thus, we hold that access to the 
testifying witness is allowed .... " Id. at 302, 414. "[D]iscovery rules designed to protect 
consulting experts do not prevent a party from calling an adversary's expert when that 
expert has been designated a 'testifying expert,' even without a shOwing of exigent 
circumstances." Id. 
In addition, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
Western Division ruled that "once an expert is deSignated. the expert is recognized as 
presenting part of the common body of discoverable, and generally admissible, 
information and testimony available to all parties. House v. Combined Insurance 
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Company of America, 168 F.R.D. 236, 245 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In House v. Combined 
Insurance Company of America, the court reasoned that once a party designates an 
expert witness as probably testifying at trial pursuant to the applicable discovery rule(s), 
lithe party will have to live with the consequence that the opposing party will likely be 
given the opportunity to depose the expert or even ·to call the expert at trial on their own 
behalf." Id. at 247. 
In the present case. plaintiffs designated in their initial expert disclosure Dr. 
Blaylock as an expert witness to be called at trial to testify 'pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). Thereafter,plaintiffs deSignated Dr. Blaylock as an expert 
witness to be called at trial to testify in accordance with IRCP 26(b)(4) in their 
supplemental expert disclosure, second supplemental expert disclosure, third 
supplemental expert disclosure, sixth supplemental expert disclosure, seventh 
supplemental expert disclosure. eighth supplemental expert disclosure, ninth 
supplemental expert disclosure, rebuttal expert disclosure, and supplemental rebuttal 
expert disclosure. 
At no time did plaintiffs de-designate or withdraw Dr. Blaylock as· an expert 
witness to be called at trial. In plaintiffs' expert disclosure, and subsequent 
supplemental expert disclosures, regarding Dr. Blaylock, plaintiffs provided Dr. 
Blaylock's opinions and related reports relating to the present case. In formulating his 
opinions and related reports, Dr. Blaylock claims to have familiarized himself with the 
applicable community standard of care relating to Nathan Coonrod, M.D., Andrew Chai, 
M.D., and Mitchell Long, D.O. Defendants had also deposed Dr. Blaylock. Accordingly, 
Dr. Blaylock was a testifying witness pursuant to IRep 26. 
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Furthermore, defendants always reserved and maintained the right to examine 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses, including Dr. Blaylock, either on direct examination or cross-
examination to establish its defense. The following documents, and responses 
contained therein, are specific examples of defendants' notice to plaintiffS of defendants' 
intent to use plaintiffs' witnesses, including expert witnesses, as well as using plaintiffs' 
witnesses' reports and depositions at trial: 
• Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, answers to interrogatory #1 and #2; 
• Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #2, #3, #5. #16, #18. and #19; 
• Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents, request for production #20; 
• Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers to plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #20, #21, and #22; 
• Nathan Coonrod. M.O.'s supplemental answers to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. answers to 
interrogatory #2, #3, #5, #17, #19, and #20; 
• Nathan Coonrod, M.O.'s answers to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, request for production #20; 
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• Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s supplemental answers to plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #21, #22, and #23. 
In fact, defendants' supplemental answer and response to interrogatory number 
three (3) to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents specifically lists Paul Blaylock, M.D. as a witness that defendants' intended 
to call as a witness at trial. Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s Supplemental Answers 
", 
and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, p. 7. Plaintiffs' interrogatory number three (3) specifically asks: 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: With respect to the persons you intend to call 
at the trial of this cause, please state the general nature of the facts to 
which they will testify. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: Defendant objects to this Interrogatory on 
the grounds it seeks the disclosure of impeachment witnesses. Without 
waiving said objection, defendant states as follows: 
... Paul Blaylock, MD: It is antiCipated Dr. Blaylock will testify consistent 
with his opinions previously disclosed. 
Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs' 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, p. 7. 
In addition, defendants' supplemental answer to interrogatory number five (5) to 
plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
specifically states "[t]o the extent any other defendant in this action is dismissed prior to 
trial, this defendant reserves the right to call or cross-examine plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses at trial. n Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s Supplemental Answers and 
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
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Documents, p. 10. Since plaintiffs disclosed Dr. Blaylock as an expert witness pursuant 
to IRCP 26(b)(4), and defendants' identified, named, and listed Dr. Blaylock as an 
expert in discovery, apprised plaintiffs of the nature of his testimony and opinions, and 
preserved their· right to examine plaintiffs' witnesses, including Dr. Blaylock, the Court 
should have permitted defendants to examine plaintiffs' expert witnesses, and 
specifically Dr. Blaylock, at trial. 
The Idaho discovery rules contain no provision directly addressing whether a 
party may call the opposing party's expert witnesses at trial. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 
882, 889, 104 P.3d 356, 363 (2004). Plaintiffs' rely upon White v. Mock in support of 
their position .that defendants could not present evidence through plaintiffs' expert 
witness, PauJ Blaylock, M.D., to testify regarding the non-party negligence of Dr. Long and 
Dr. Chai. However, White v. Mock is distinguishable from the present case because White 
dealt with the plaintiff seeking to use the defendant's expert witness, who the defense had 
identified as a rebuttal witness, but who would not be called to testify. White v. Mock, 140 
Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004). The Court relied specifically on IRCP 
26(b)(4)(B) which states: 
Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Experts not expected as witnesses. 
A party may not discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who 
has been retained or sp~ciany employed by another party in anticipation of 
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a 
witness at trial, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or except upon a shOwing 
of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other 
means. 
IRCP 26(b)(4)(B). 
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The Supreme Court, in White, held "the rules do not allow for depositions of a 
party's expert who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(8)(4)(8), it follows that the expert cannot be called by the opposing party during trial 
unless a proper showing of exceptional circumstances is made." White v. Mock, 140 
Idaho at 889, 104 P.3d at 363. In the present case, IRCP 26(b)(4)(8) does not apply 
because plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. 8laylock, not only expected to testify as a expert 
witness, he testified at trial as an expert witness. Thus, the holding in White v. Mock, 
disallowing a party to use the opposing party's expert witness. is not on point for the 
facts of the present case and does not apply. Defendants should have been allowed to 
call the plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. 8laylock, to establish negligence against non-
parties as a defense. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs rely on the holding in White v. Mock stating "a general 
'reservation of rights· to call the other party's witnesses is not the type of disclosure 
envisioned by the rule, in that it does not apprise the opposing party of the identity of 
the specific expert to be relied upon and does not reveal the general SUbstance of that 
testimony or its relation to the legal theory of [the party attempting to call the witness]." 
White v. Mock, 140 Idaho at 889,104 P.3d at 363. 
The holding in White v. Mock does not apply to the present case because 
defendants' supplemental answer and response to interrogatory number three (3) to 
plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
specifically identifies, names, and lists Paul Blaylock, M.D. as an expert witness that 
defendants' intended to call as a witness at trial. Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s 
Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and 
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Requests for Production of Documents, p. 7. Defendants' discovery disclosure also 
apprised plaintiffs of the nature of Dr. Blaylock's testimony and opinions, in accordance 
with the applicable IRCP, and preserved their right to examine plaintiffs' witnesses, 
including Dr. Blaylock, the Court should have permitted defendants to examine plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses, and specifically Dr. Blaylock. at trial. 
However. this Court denied defendants' right to call Dr. Blaylock in their case-in-
chief to prove the negligence of non-parties as required by Idaho law despite plaintiffs' 
expert disclosure to defendants concerning Dr. !3laylock's opinions. his familiarity with 
the local standard of care, and defendants' deposition of Dr. Blaylock and even though 
defendants' provided sufficient lega/ notice to plaintiffS and the Court of defendants' 
reservation of right to call plaintiffs' expert witnesses. including Dr. Blaylock, at tria/. As 
demonstrated in the list of defendants' discovery responses, there was no basis for this 
Court to deny the defendants their right to call Dr. Blaylock in order for the defendants' 
to establish the negligence of non-parties in the above-entitled cause of action. 
Moreover, the Court erred by denying defendants an opportunity to cross-
examine Dr. Blaylock regarding his opinion relating to the negligence of the non-parties. 
Dr. Long and Dr. Chai. Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) states: 
Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to 
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affectIng the 
credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, 
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
I.R.E. 611 (b) (emphasis added). 
Dr. Blaylock possessed opinions regarding the negligence of defendants, Dr. 
Coonrod and Dr. Newman. as well as the negligence of non-parties, Dr. Long and Dr. 
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Chai. Dr. Blaylock's opinions regarding the negligence of nonMparties is a matter 
affecting the credibility of Dr. Blaylock because Dr. Blaylock opined Dr. Coonrod and Dr. 
Newman were negligent in their treatment of Maria Aguilar, therefore, defendants 
should be able to explore and impeach Dr. Blaylock whether he had an opinion as to 
the negligence of non-parties, Dr. Long and Dr. Chai. 
Whether Dr. Blaylock had an opinion as to the negligence of Dr. Long and/or Dr. 
Chai is a matter of credibility that the defendants should have an opportunity to question 
and impeach Dr. Blaylock, and the jury should have had the opportunity to weigh the 
credibility of Dr. Blaylock's testimony resulting from cross-examination of his opinions 
regarding the negligence of defendants, Dr. Coonrod and Dr. Newman, as well as the 
negligence of non-parties, Dr. Long and Dr. Chai, and their roles in causing the death in 
Dr. Blaylock's opinion. 
Furthermore, it was error for the Court to deny defendants the opportunity to use. 
and/or read the deposition testimony of Dr. Blaylock into the trial record, the deposition 
of Dr. Blaylock pertaining to Dr. Blaylock's opinions for the negligence of the non-
parties, Dr. Long and Dr. Chai. Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b) permits the use of former 
testimony of a witness jf the witness is unavailable. Specifically, I. R. E. 804(b)( 1) states: 
(1) Fonner testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing 
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action 
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
I.R.E.804(b)(1). 
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After Dr. Blaylock testified during plaintiffs' case-in-chief, he left the State of Idaho, 
without defendants agreeing to excuse him as a witness, and returned to his home state 
of Oregon and was unable to testify further during the course of the trial. Thus, 
defendants' were able to lay foundation as to Dr. Blaylock's unavailability, and should 
have been permitted to use Dr. Blaylock's former testimony in his deposition in whole, 
or in part, to establish his opinions regarding the negligence of non-parties. However, 
the Court denied defendants the opportunity to use Dr. Blaylock's deposition and his 
opinions relating to Dr. Long's and Dr. Chai's negligence at trial; and such denial by the 
Court was error. 
The Court allowed defendants to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony 
of Dr. Blaylock pertaining to his familiarity with the standard of care and opinion relating 
to the negligence of the non-parties, but the Court did not permit such testimony to 
come before the jury. The Court's refusal to allow defendants to present evidence 
through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the non-party 
negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes an abuse of discretion and/or an error 
in law which prevented defendants from having a fair trial, and therefore, this Court 
should grant defendants' motion for a new trial. 
2. The jury instruction regarding proximate cause constitutes a misstatement 
of Idaho law. and therefore. an error in law occurring at the trial and which 
prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this matter, pursuant to 
IRCP 59(a)(1) and/or (7). is appropriate on the basis the Court's instruction of the jury 
during the course of trial with regard to the proximate cause element of plaintiffs' cause 
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of action constituted an error in law and which prevented defendants from having a fair 
trial. 
The court gave Instruction No. 23, which provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
When I use the expression "proximate cause, II I mean a cause that, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is 
a SUbstantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the 
negligent conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct 
of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
The Court's jury instruction is contrary to the most recent Idaho pattern jury instructions 
and impermissibly alters plaintiffs' burden of proof with regard to the element of 
proximate cause by applying a "substantial factor" test, rather than a "but-far" test, for 
proving proximate cause. 
There is no question in this medical malpractice cause of action, plaintiffs have 
the burden to prove not only that the defendants breached the applicable standard of 
health care, but also the al/eged breach of the standard of health care practice was the 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. Hake v. Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 1062, 793 
P.2d 1230, 1234 (1990). This burden requires plaintiffs prove defendants' alleged 
breach, if any, was more probably than not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injUries. 
Therefore, it is proper for the jury, as the finder of fact, to determine whether plaintiff has 
met his burden of proof as to causation. However, in this case, the impermissible 
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alteration of the applicable burden of proof amounts to an error in law, and a proper 
basis for the grant of a new trial. 
In particular, the Court's modified IDJI.2d 2.30.2 instruction applied the 
"substantial factor" test for proximate causation by omitting the sentence: "It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway," and 
such an omission constitutes an error in law during the course of trial in accordance with 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7). Defendants posit that this Court should have 
used the "but-for" test for proving proximate causation by either including the omitted 
sentence: "It is not a proximate cause if the injury loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway" from pattern IDJI.2d 2.30.2. by using pattern IDJI.2d 2.30.1 (which 
instructs the jury concerning the "but-for" test for proximate causation), or by using 
defendants' proposed jury instruction number 18 (instruction regarding "but-for test for 
proximate causation), which is a modified version of pattern IDJI.2d 2.30.1. 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1 reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or 
damage, and but for that cause the damage would not have occurred. It 
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if 
the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.· 
[There may be one or more proximate causes of injury. When the 
negligent conduct of two or more persons or entities contribute 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct 
of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury.] 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1 - Proximate cause - "but for" test (October 2003). Defendants' proposed 
jury instruction number 18, reads as follows: 
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When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage 
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred 
anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury, 
Plaintiff must prove proximate cause by expert testimony, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 18. 
Proximate cause is composed of two elements which are cause in fact (actual 
cause) and the true proximate cause or "legal cause. II Newberry v. Martens. 142 Idaho 
284, 288, 127 P.3d 187. 191 (2005); Collins v. Collins, 130 Idaho 70S, 946 P.2d 1345 
(1997). "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced a 
particular consequence. True proximate cause 'focuses upon legal policy in terms of 
whether responsibility will be extended to the consequences of conduct which has 
occurred.'" Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho at 288, 127 P.3d at 191 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Idaho uses two mutually exclusive tests to determine proximate cause. The court 
may use a "but for" test to determine proximate cause when there is only one al/eged 
cause of plaintiffs injury. Newberry v. Martens. 142 Idaho at 288, 127 P.3d at 191. 
When there is evidence of two or more possible causes of plaintiff's injury, a court 
employs the "substantial factor test" to determine proximate cause. Newberry v. 
Martens, 142 Idaho at 288. 127 P.3d at 191; Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 961 P.2d 
1181 (1998); Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 595. 818 P.2d 295, 299 (1991). 
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Plaintiffs rely upon Newberry v. Martens, to support the use of the "substantial 
factor" test and the. Court's application of the "substantial factor" test was appropriate 
because the present case had multiple causes that lead to the injury and death of Maria 
Aguilar. Plaintiffs also rely on Newberry v. Martens to claim the "but-for' test is inapplicable 
because defendants Ilcannot simultaneously point to a second cause independent of (his) 
negligence and at the same time maintain that this is a single cause case." Newberry v. 
Martens, 142 Idaho at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. However. this argument fails because 
defendants were precluded from offering the testimony of expert witness, Dr. Blaylock, to . 
show the negligence of non-parties (Dr. Chai and Dr. Long), and therefore, were unable to 
"point to a second cause independent of Dr. Coonrod or Primary Health Care Center's 
negligence. Moreover, the "substantial factor" test does not apply to the present case 
because it is only a single force or cause case for purposes of proximate causation. 
The "but for" test is appropriate for cases that involve only a single force or 
cause. Hilden v. Ball. 117 Idaho 314,787 P.2d 1122 (1998); See also Fussell v. St. 
Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 595, 818 P.2d 295, 299 (1991). In Hilden, a patient died from 
cardiac arrest brought on by a lack of oxygen to the heart and the plaintiff alleged the. 
attending doctor's failure to preoxygenate the patient prior to surgery caused the 
patient's death. Hilden v. Ball. at 335, 787 P.2d at 1143; Fussel v. St. Clair, at 595,818 
P.2d at 299. The doctor's defense was that the failure to preoxygenate the patient was 
not a violation of the local standard of health care. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the lower court was not wrong in viewing the case as a Single cause case. Hilden v. 
Ball. at 335, 787 P.2d at 1143; Fussel v. st. Clair. at 595, 818 P.2d at 299. 
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The facts in the present case are similar to the facts of Hilden. The decedent, 
Maria Aguilar visited Dr. Coonrod in April, May, and June 2003. Plaintiffs allege Dr .. 
Coonrod's failure to diagnose a pulmonary embolism was the cause of death. Dr. 
Coonrod's defense (and Primary Health Care Center's defense) is his failure to 
diagnose Mrs. Aguilar's pulmonary embolism was not a violation of the local standard of 
health care. Therefore, the Court should have applied the "but for" test in determining 
proximate cause when instructing the jury. 
The Court should have instructed the jury conceming the "but-for" test for proximQte 
causation, rather than the "substantial factor" test, because the above-entitled case 
involves only a single cause-plaintiffs' allegation that Dr. Coonrod failed to diagnose a 
pulmonary embolism-and therefore, it was appropriate for the Court to instruct the jury 
concerning the "but for" test for proximate causation. 
Thus, defendants respectfully submit the Court's jury instruction regarding 
proximate cause amounts to a misstatement of Idaho law, and fails to address the key 
issue of burden of proof with regard to an essential element of this medical malpractice 
case. On the basis of the Significant prejudice to the defendants of the foregoing error 
of law in instruction of the jury, it is proper for this Court to grant defendants a new trial 
in this matter. 
3. The trial court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually. rather than 
collectively. for non-economic damages on the special verdict form are a 
misstatement or misapplication of Idaho law. and therefore. an abuse of 
discretion and/or an error in law occurring at trial and prevented 
defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this case, pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) and/or (7), is appropriate on the basis the trial 
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court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually. rather than collectively, for non-
economic damages on the special verdict form are a misstatement or misapplication of 
Idaho law, and therefore, an abuse of discretion and/or an error in law occurring at trial 
and such abuse of discretion and/or error prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
The statutory cap on non-economic damages, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-
1603, applies to all plaintiffs collectively, and not individual/y. See Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center's Objection to the Judgment Upon the 
Verdict and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment To Apply the Statutory Cap On 
Non-Economic Damages To AU Plaintiffs Col/ectively. In regards to the statutory cap for 
non-economic damages applying to all plaintiffs, defendants incorporate herein and in 
their entirety, the argument and analysis as set forth in their Objection to the Judgment 
Upon the Verdict and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment To Apply Non-Economic 
Damages Cap to All Plaintiffs Collectively and Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
to Alter or Amend the Judgment. Therefore, since one cap for non-economic damages 
applies to a/l plaintiffs, regardless of the number of plaintiffs in a cause of action, the 
Court abused its discretion and/or erred by separately listing a non-economic damages 
award to each plaintiff on the special verdict form. 
Furthermore, the pattern Idaho Jury Instructions provide a model special verdict 
form which the Court may modify to meet the specific issues of a case. IDJI.2d 1.43.1. 
Specifically, the Comments section for IDJI.2d 1.43.1 states: 
This form is included only as an example, and may be modified as 
needed to meet the specific issues of a given case. The committee 
recommends separate damage allocations be no more numerous than 
between economic and non-economic damages. In the court's discretion 
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the liability questions may be split between negligence and proximate 
cause. 
IDJI.2d 1.43.1 - Example verdict on special interrogatories (emphasis added). 
The special verdict form's separation of damages for non-economic damages to 
each individual plaintiff is improper and is error because IDJI.2d 1.43.1 instructs one 
determination of economic damages and one determination of non-economic damages 
for the plaintiffs. 
Also, the Court erred by listing the non-economic damages award to each 
plaintiff individually because wrongful death actions are derivative, and the heirs of the 
decedent, Maria Aguilar, are dependant upon the right of action which the decedent 
would have had, had the decedent survived her injuries. Therefore, in the present wrongful 
death cause of action, plaintiffs wholly derive their claims and damages from the injuries 
suffered by Maria Aguilar.1Th~ Court's use of a special verdict form listing non-economic 
damages to each plaintiff individual is prejudicial to defendants because the plaintiffs in a 
wrongful death case derive their claims and damages from the individual decedent, Maria 
Aguilar, and the statutory cap on non-economic damages applies to all plaintiffs 
collectively, pursuant to I.C. § 6-1603, in a wrongful death cause of action. Thus, it was 
error for the Court to not list the plaintiffs together as one line item for non-economic 
damages on the special verdict form, as Maria Aguilar would have been if she had 
survived to pursue damages for her injuries, to prevent undue prejudice to the defendants. 
1 Defendan1s address the derivative nature of wrongful death causes of action in greater detail in their 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Objection to the Judgment Upon the Verdict and Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Judgment to Apply the statutory Cap on Non-Economic Damages to All Plaintiffs 
Collectively. Defendants hereby incorporate the arguments of said reply memorandum in its entirety. 
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The Court used a special verdict form which had one line item for an economic 
damages award to plaintiffs col/ectively, but listed a non-economic damages award to 
each plaintiff individually. Therefore, the Court abused its discretion by using a special 
verdict form which separately listed plaintiffs individually, rather than col/ectively and as 
one line item, for non~economic damages, and which abuse of discretion constitutes a 
misstatement and/or misapplication and/or an error of Idaho law. On the basis of the 
significant prejudice to the defendants of the foregoing error of Jaw in instruction of the 
jury, it is proper for this Court to grant defendants a new trial in this matter. 
4. The award of economic and non~economic damages are excessive. 
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, 
with no supporting evidence in the trial record. 
Defendants submit the jury's award of economic damages in the amount of 
$700,000 is excessive and its award of non-economic damages in the amount of 
$3,500,000 is excessive, both awards appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice with no supporting evidence in the trial record. Therefore, 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and/or (6), it is proper for this Court 
to grant a new trial. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) states a new trial may be 
granted for excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6} states a new trial may be 
granted for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
In Tello v. United States. 2009 WL 1064940 (W.D. Tex. 2009). the United States 
District Court for the Westem District of Texas analyzed Texas law to determine 
whether household services are economic damages not subject to a statutory cap, or 
whether household services are non-economic damages subject to the applicable 
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statutory cap on non-economic damages in a wrongful death cause of action. The 
pertinent Texas statute defines economic damages as "compensatory damages 
intended to compensate a claimant for actual economic or pecuniary loss; the term does 
not include exemplary damages. Id. (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 
41.001(4». Since the applicable Texas statute did not define "actual economic or 
pecuniary loss," the Tello court relied upon the language of the Mississippi medical 
malpractice statute for gUidance, which stated in relevant part, "actual economic 
damages" include "objectively verifiable pecuniary damages arising from . . . costs of 
obtaining substitute domestic services.'! Id. (quoting Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-1-BO(b» 
(emphasis added). 
The Tello court held that the Mississippi definition of economic damages 
comported with the Texas statute pertaining to economic damages, as well as the 
legislative intent of the respective Texas statute, and concluded a plaintiff must provide 
evidence of actual payment for the replaced household services for the recovery to be 
economic in nature. Id. The Tello court stated, specifically: 
The Court does not determine that the loss of [the decedent's] 
homemaker services such as cooking, cleaning, child care, and the like, 
is not a very real loss and a significant part of the damages which 
plaintiffs sustained. Certainly, the services perfonned by [the decedent] 
were manifestations of love and affection and the loss of theses (sic) 
services is a consideration in determining damages in this wrongful death 
case. However, there is no evidence the loss of these services 
necessarily resulted in direct financial loss to the survivors, and so in this 
respect it is not a pecuniary loss. Accordingly, plaintiffs' recovery attaches 
to the non-economic loss of companionship and society inherent in her 
relationship with her family. 
Id. Consequently, the Tello court applied the statutory cap for non-economic damages 
to the household services portion of the damages award. 
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Likewise, Idaho law is similar to the Texas and Mississippi statutes relied upon 
by the Tello court. Idaho defines "economic damages" to mean "objectively verifiable 
monetary Joss, including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, 
loss of use of property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of business or 
employment opportunities." I.C. § 6-1601 (2008) (emphasis added). The Tello court's 
analysis of economic damages and household services is applicable and relevant to the 
above-entitled case, and this Court should adopt the Tello court's reasoning and 
holdings relating to household services to the present case. 
Plaintiffs seek to distinguish the case relied upon by defendants, Tello v. United 
States, 2009 WL 1064940 0/'I.D. Tex. 2009). from the facts of the present case. 
Specifically, plaintiffs point to minor differences in the statutory language of the 
Mississippi statute and the Idaho statute in defining "economic damages." Plaintiffs 
submit the Mississippi statute's use of the phrase "pecuniary damages" differs from the 
Idaho statute's use of the phrase "monetary loss" have differing connotative distinctions. 
Plaintiffs argue "pecuniary damages" denotes specific economic or financial damages, 
while "monetary loss" denotes a generalized calculation of compensation; however 
these distinctions lack merit. 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) defines "pecuniary" as: "Monetary; relating to 
money; financial; consisting of money or that which can be valued in money.n Black's 
Law Dictionary (5th Edition) defines "monetary" as: "The usual meaning is 'pertaining to 
coinage or currency or having to do with money', but it has been held to include 
personal property." Both the term "pecuniary" and the term "monetary" possess the 
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s;,3me connotation-both terms deal with money or currency. Therefore, the term 
"pecuniary damages" in the Mississippi "economic damages" statute and the term 
"monetary loss" in the Idaho "economic damages" statute have the same meaning· and 
connotation: damages, loss, or harm to money. Also, both Mississippi and Idaho require 
that a person's economic damage, loss, or money be "objectively verifiable," including 
. objectively verifiable damages or loss associated with costs of obtaining substitute 
domestic services. 
In defending the economic damages awarded for the "cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services," plaintiffs claim the term {!including but not limited to" in Idaho's 
statutory definition of "economic damages" incorporates losses verifiable by economic 
analysis but which the plaintiff is not actually incurring expenses for and that Idaho 
requires such losses to be "objectively verifiable." Defendants agree the "cost of 
obtaining substitute domestic services" must be "objectively verifiable'" for an award of 
such costs as economic damages, but defendants disagree that the term "including but 
not limited to· in Idaho's statutory definition of "economic damages" incorporates losses 
verifiable by economic analysis but which expenses the plaintiff has not actually 
incurred. 
Plaintiffs cite IDJI.2d 9.01, the pattern jury instruction for general damages, to 
assert household services are clearly economic damages and no logical reason exists 
for a distinction between a general negligence case and a wrongful death case in 
differentiating between economic and non-~conomic damages for household services. 
However, the Court correctly used IDJI.2d 9.05, the pattern jury instruction for wrongful 
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death damages, and properly instructed the Joss of decedent's services are 
characterized as non-economic damages. See Jury Instruction No. 25. 
In contrast, other than the opinions of plaintiffs' expert witness, Mr. Hofman, 
relating to the economic effect of lost household services, plaintiffs did not proffer any 
evidence pertaining to actual or incurred financial or economic loss sustained by the 
plaintiffs regarding household services. See Tello v. United States, 2009 WL 1064940 
0/V.D. Tex. 2009). Thus, the evidence proffered by plaintiffs is insufficient to sustain an 
award for $700,000 in economic damages because plaintiffs did not provide evidence of 
the actual or incurred economic loss suffered by the loss of the decedent's household 
services. 
Furthermore, in Dyetv. McKinley. 139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236 (2003). the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed whether or not Medicare write-offs are a collateral source 
pursuant to I.C. § 6-1606 (Idaho law entitled "Prohibiting double recoveries from 
collateral sources"), or, if not, whether the write-offs should be treated the same as a 
collateral source. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003). 
Dyet v. McKinley is a personal injury case where the plaintiff incurred $89,367.71 for 
medical expenses, but since the plaintiff was a Medicare patient, Medicare mandatorily 
reduced the bill by $67,655.22 to $21,712.49 pursuant to Medicare regulations and 
federal law. Id., 139 Idaho at 527-28,81 P.3d at 1237-38. 
In Dyet v. Mc!<inley. the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination 
that Medicare write-offs should be treated as collateral source and concurred with the 
district court's reasoning that "plaintiffs may not recover the amount of the write-off from 
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a tortfeasor because it was not an item of damages for which the plaintiff ever became 
obligated." Id., 139 Idaho at 529,81 P.3d at 1239 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the present case, plaintiffs failed to proffer any evidence at trial, 
either by lay testimony or expert testimony through Cornelius Hofman, showing actual 
or incurred financial expenditures by the plaintiffs between the time Maria Aguilar died in 
2003 to the time of trial in 2009 for obtaining substitute household services. Thus, as 
with Medicare write-offs in Dyet -v. McKinley that could not be recovered since the 
plaintiff never incurred the expense, plaintiffs in the present case cannot recover 
damages for costs associated with obtaining substitute domestic services for which 
such- expenditures were never paid for or actually incurred. Since plaintiffs provided n2 
evidence pertaining to the actually incurred costs and expenditures related to obtaining 
substitute household services between the decedent's death in 2003 and trial in 2009, 
the Court should preclude plaintiffs from recovering economic damages for household 
services in the amount of $415,922 in the lower bound or $455,153 in the higher bound 
as awarded by the jUry. 
Therefore, at most, plaintiffs produced evidence of economic damages in the 
total amount of $244,847 in the lower bound or $284,078 In the higher bound ($700,000 
economic damages jury award minus either $415,922 in the lower bound or $455,153 in 
the higher bound of estimated lost household services, respectively). Plaintiffs' jury 
award for household services are non-economic damages in the amount of $415,922 in 
the lower bound or $455,153 in the higher bound, and the Court must apportion 
plaintiffs' total loss in household serVices of $415,922 in the lower bound and $455,153 
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in the higher bound to the non-economic damages jury award, and apply the statutory 
cap on non-economic damages to the household services award. 
Furthermore, in accordance with Idaho law, the issue of whether damages 
awarded are excessive is an issue that may form the basis of both a motion for a new 
trial; or, in the alternative, a remittitur. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) is 
applicable to support a grant of a new trial in instances where damages are so 
excessive or inadequate as to appear to be the result of partiality by the jury. Pratton v. 
Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 851, 840 P.2d 392, 395 (1992). If the trial judge believes the 
jury's award may· only be explained as resulting from passion or prejudice, then he 
should grant a new trial under 59(a)(5). Id. When a new tnal is granted pursuant. to Rule 
59(a)(5) on the basis the damages are excessive, the Court is not required to find the 
verdict was not supported by the evidence as a condition precedent to granting the new 
trial. Id., 122 Idaho at 852,840 P.2d at 396. 
When a party contends the jury award is so great as to appear to have been 
activated by passion or prejudice, the trial court is not restricted to rule on this issue as 
a matter of Jaw, but must weigh the evidence and considerations of doing substantial 
justice. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 624, 603 P.2d 575, 580 (1979). The Court 
must look at the amount of damages awarded and compare the award with the amount 
of damages the trial court, in its view, would have awarded. In Quick v. Crane, the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the following rule set forth in Dinneen, supra: 
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive 
damages. the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the 
jury's award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the 
disparity is so great that it appears to the tria) court that the award was 
given under the influence of paSSion or prejudice, the verdict ought not 
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stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice 
nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of 
such is sufficient. A trial court is not restricted to ruling a verdict 
inadequate or excessive as a matter of law. Additionally, the rule that a 
verdict will not be set aside when supported by SUbstantial but conflicting 
evidence has no application to trial court ruling upon a motion for new 
trial. 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986) (citations omitted, 
italicized emphasis in original, further emphasis added), quoting Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 
625-26, 603 P.2d at 580-81. 
In Quick v. Crane, the Court further provided, again citing to the Dinneen opinion: 
Trial courts, unlike jurors, have the advantage of having heard and 
determined many hundreds of damage claims. A trial court in a jury trial 
hears exactly the same evidence as the jury hears, and makes his own 
inward assessment of credibility and weight. So, when after a trial the 
jury returns a verdict which is thereafter assai/ed, either as excessive or 
as inadequate, the trial court's judgment is then called into play, requiring 
of him a weighing of evidence. The sale question on a Rule 59{a)(5) 
motion Is the amount of the jury's damage award, as compared to the 
amount of damages the trial court in his view of the evidence would have 
awarded. 
Id., 111 Idaho at 768--69, 727 P.2d at 1196-97 (italicized emphasis in original), quoting 
Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 624-25, 603 P.2d at 579-80. 
_If the trial judge discovers his determination of damages is so substantially 
different from that of the jury so he can only explain this difference as resulting from 
some unfair behavior, or what the law calls "passion or prejudice," on the part of the jury 
against one or some of the parties, then he should grant a new trial. Quick, 111 Idaho at 
769,727 P.2d at 1197. As the Quick court noted, however, it is difficult to establish how 
SUbstantial the disparity must be to warrant a new trial: 
How substantial this difference must be is impossible to formulate with 
any degree of accuracy. It will necessarily vary with the factual context of 
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each case and the trial judge's sense of fairness and justice. Frequent 
characterizations have included the idea that the disparity must "shock 
the conscience" of the trial judge or lead him to conclude that it would be 
"unconscionable" to let the damage award stand as the jury set it. These 
characterizations, of course, do little more than restate the trial judge's 
discretionary perspective but are, nonetheless, frequently employed in 
other areas of the law and, therefore, may be useful to the trial judge. 
Id., 111 Idaho at 769-770, 769, 727 P.2d at 1197-98. 
The Court must weigh the evidence. and proceed through an analysis of 
damages in this case. The Court must compare its evaluation of economic and non-
economic damages with the award of the jury. As the record reflects, the jury awarded 
plaintiffs in this matter an amount substantially in excess of the amount plaintiffs actually 
proved during the course of the trial, specifically in regard to the amount of lost 
household services actually incurred or sustained. A review of the amount of damages 
awarded by the jury can only lead to the conclusion the jury was influenced by passion 
or prejudice in this case. Such an award should not be allowed to stand. 
Furthermore, it is proper for this Court to grant a new trial in accordance with 
Rule 59(a){6) on the basis there was insufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict in 
this matter. As is outlined hereinabove, it is clear plaintiffs did not present evidence to 
support an economic damages verdict In the amount of $700,000 or a non-economic 
damages verdict in the amount of $3,500,000, and upon consideration of evidence 
submitted by plaintiffs in the present matter it is highly probable a different result would 
follow retrial. 
In the event this Court does not find the economic or non-economic damages 
awarded by the jury appear to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, said damages must have been awarded based upon speculation or 
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guesswork. Plaintiffs have the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also 
the amount of damages. Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc. t 104 Idaho 317,321, 
658 P.2d 988, 992 (el. App.1983), citing Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126,391 P.2d 344 
(1964). "The law does not pennit the arriving at the amount of damages by conjecture.1I 
Beare. supra. Idaho courts have consistently held damages must be proved with 
reasonable certainty and cannot be based on mere speculation. See Hake, 117 Idaho at 
1062, 793 P.2d at 1234; Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 
182,595 P.2d 709, 716 (1979). Because the record and proceedings reflect insufficient 
evidence to justify the economic damages award or the non-economic damages award, 
if the jury did not arrive at the excessive economic or non-economic damages award 
under the influence of passion or prejudice, the jury must have improperly speculated to 
arrive at said sums. 
When a motion for a new trial is based upon subdivision 6, the trial court must 
determine whether the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, if the ends of 
justice would be served by vacating the verdict, and whether a different result would 
follow retrial. Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 422, 835 P.2d 651, 657 (Ct. App. 
1992). Under Rule 59(a)(6), a trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, but is free to weigh conflicting evidence 
himself. Nations v. Bonner Building Supply, 113 Idaho 568,572, 746 P.2d 1027, 1031 
(Ct. App. 1987). If the judge, having considered the entire evidence, and having given 
full respect to the jury's findings, is left with the conviction an injustice has been done, 
he may grant a new trial. Id. 
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On a motion for new trial, unlike a motion for directed verdict or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court has broad discretion to weigh aU the evidence, 
pass on the credibility of witnesses and make ind(3pendent findings of fact and compare 
them to the jury's findings. Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 749 P.2d 1012, 
1017 (et. App. 1988), cert denied 114 Idaho 147, 754 P.2d 1184 and 116 Idaho 467, 
776 P.2d 829 (1988); Litchfield, supra. Furthermore, after the trial court has performed 
its own weighing of the evidence and review of the witnesses' credibility. it may set 
aside the verdict based upon its own independent evaluation of the evidence, even 
though there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Litchfield, supra; Quick, 111 
Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. It should be noted with regard to the determination on a 
motion for new trial, the trial court is not merely "authorized" to engage in this weighing 
process, but is obligated to do so. Litchfield, supra. In addition, on a motion for new 
trial, the trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Quick, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. 
In the matter at issue it is clear the jury's award of economic damages and non-
economic damages are against the clear weight of the evidence, the ends of justice 
would be served by vacating the verdict, and it is highly probable a different result would 
follow retrial. In addition. defendants submit the awards by the jury establish the jury 
was influenced by passion and prejudice. or in the alternative, awarded damages based 
upon speculation or guesswork. Therefore, the grant of a new trial is proper in this 
matter. 
B. MOTION FOR REMITTITUR OF DAMAGES 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT FOR REMITIITUR, AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, PAGE 31 
In the alternative to the foregoing argument in favor of a new trial, in the event 
this Court denies said motion for new trial, defendants respectfully submit an 
amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of damages is appropriate in accordance 
with Rules 59(e) and 59.1, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, reducing the amount of 
economic damages in this case to $244,847, or another amount deemed reasonable 
and appropriate by this Court, and non-economic damages to $682,200.65, or another 
amount deemed reasonable and appropriate by this Court. In accordance with said 
Rules, the Court may grant, as an alternative to a new trial, a remittitur of damages. See 
also, Quick, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P .2d at 1198. The amount by which the trial judge 
offers to reduce the damage award is a discretionary decision that is inexorably linked ' 
to the exercise of discretion in ruling on a new trial motion. Quick, supra~ 
However, it is important to note a potential limitation to the alternative of an 
amendment and remittitur. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Quick, 
supra, if the trial court concludes "the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice to 
such an extent that such passion or prejudice may have infected the jury's decision on 
liability as well as damages," then use of the remittitur as an alternative is improper. Id., 
111 Idaho at 770, 727 P .2d at 1198 (emphasis added). In such an instance, the trial 
court m!!!l order a new trial. Id. 
Plaintiffs submit a reduction of the non-economic damages to the statutory cap is 
a legislatively mandated remittitur of damages. Plaintiffs do not cite any case law or 
local rule to support the assertion that the Idaho Legislature intended the statutory cap 
to act as remittitur of damages, and therefore, their respective argument fails. Neither 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59 (e) and 59.1 nor LC. § 6-1603 make reference to 
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the statutory cap on non-economic damages being a remittitur of damages. Moreover, 
even if the Court applies the statutory cap to reduce non-economic damages, a 
remittitur of economic damages would not have occurred. 
The Court must weigh the evidence and proceed through an analysis of 
damages in this case. The Court must compare its evaluation of economic and non-
economic damages with the award of the jury. In addition, given the significant 
departure from the evidence presented at trial, defendants request the Court further 
review, in its discretion, whether the jury may have also been influenced by passion or 
prejudice in deciding the liability issues as well, in which case a new trial is the exclusive 
proper remedy. 
C. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Defendants respectfully request this Court rule, as a matter of law, that Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. was not negligent nor the proximate cause of decedenfs death. 
Defendants submit the jury's finding that Nathan Coonrod, M.D. was negligent is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, and requires the Court to grant a judgment in favor of 
defendants notwithstanding the jury's verdict. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) governs a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and reads, in pertinent part: 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... may 
be made whether or not a party moved for a directed 
verdict . . .. If a verdict was returned the court may allow 
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and 
either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment. ... 
I.R.C.P.50(b). 
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Under Idaho law, the requisite standard on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
motion (hereinafter referred to as "JNOV motion») is whether substantial and competent 
evidence exists to support the jury's verdict after drawing al/ inferences in favor of the 
verdict. Homer v. Sani-Top. Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 238, 141 P.3d 1099, 1107 (2006). The 
party moving for a JNOV motion admits any adverse facts and the court makes all 
, 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 233, 141 P.3d at 1102 
(citing Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equipment. Co.! Inc., 137 Idaho 578,580,51 P.3d 392, 394 
(2002». "A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that 
of the jury." Id. (citing Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 
(1990». 
At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of 
law on the issue of whether Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s conduct was negligent or the 
proximate cause of Maria Aguilar's death. Defendants now renew that motion, and 
request the Court rule, as a matter of law, that Dr. Coonrod was not negligent nor the 
proximate cause of the decedent's death. 
Defendants base their JNOV motion on the plaintiffs' failure to establish sufficient 
foundatIon for their expert witnesses, Paul Blaylock, M.D.'s and Samuel Lebaron, 
M.D.'s, testimony and opinions as to the local standard of care relating to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and any breach of said standard of care, as required by Idaho Code 
Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. SpeCifically, plaintiffs failed to establish that their expert 
witnesses possessed "actual knowledgen of the community standard of care applicable 
to Dr. Coonrod or that Dr. Coonrod failed to meet the local community standard of 
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health care practice relating to the practice of family medicine in April, May and June, 
2003. 
The relevant community, for purposes of the "community" standard of health care 
practice, is defined by Idaho Code § 6-1012 as the "geographical area ordinarily served 
by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to Which such care was or allegedly 
should have been provided." I.C. § 6-1012. In the case at issue. the local community for 
which plaintiffs' expert witness must have actual knowledge of the standard of care is 
. Nampa, Idaho. 
In order to introduce expert testimony in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 
. and 6-1013, plaintiffs must establish each expert witness possessed actual knowledge 
of the applicable standard of health care practice. Plaintiffs refer to Mr. Foster's Affidavit 
and a bench brief filed on May 4, 2009 to submit Dr. Lebaron familiarized himself with 
the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho as it pertained to Dr. Coonrod. However, no 
proof exists showing Dr. Lebaron possessed "actual knowledgen of the applicable 
standard of care to Dr. Coonrod as required by I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs state Dr. Blaylock possessed actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care, by referencing expert disclosures, and also, assert Dr. 
Blaylock did not need to be board-certified as a family practice physician to testify 
against Dr. Coonrod, who is a family practice physician. See Pearson v. Parsons, 114 
Idaho 334, 337, 757 P.2d 197, 200 (1988) ("There is no requirement in [Idaho Code 
Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013] that an expert whose testimony is offered to establish a 
case of medical malpractice against a board certified physician must also be board 
certified in the same specialty"). 
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Defendants do not dispute the holding in Pearson v. Parsons, however, plaintiffs 
failed to show Dr. Blaylock possessed "actual knowledge" of the applicable standard of 
care pertaining to Dr. Coonrod pursuant to the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013. Plaintiffs' proferred evidence regarding Dr. Blaylock's acquisition of the 
knowledge of the standard of care (Le. his conversation with Dr. Roach) does not prove 
Dr. Blaylock had actual knowledge of the standard of care. 
Plaintiffs seek to distinguish defendants' case law as inapplicable to the facts of 
the present case; ,however, the cases cited by defendants are on point for the 
applicable issue of whether Dr. Lebaron and Dr. Blaylock possessed actual know/edge 
ofthe standard' of care as to Dr. Coonrod. Defendants' cited·cases, Strode v. Lenzi, 116 
Idaho 214, 775 P.2d 106 (1989), Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 795 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 
1990). and Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 (1994). all hold that an 
expert witness must have actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care in order 
for such testimony to be admissible at trial. If an expert witness cannot establish actual 
knowledge of the applicable and local standard of care, pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 
6-1013, then such testimony is inadmissible andlor stricken from the record. See, Strode 
v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 775 P.2d 106 (1989). Kunzv. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130,795 P.2d 
24 (Ct. App. 1990), and Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 (1994). 
Furthermore, in Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294. 815 P.2d 1034 (1991). the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the district court's dismissal, 'upon defendanfs motion, of a 
medical malpractice case where the plaintiff's expert witness failed to show actual 
knowledge and familiarity with the local standard of care for the local community of 
Pocatello, Idaho. Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,815 P.2d 1034 (1991). Specifically, in 
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Gubler v. Boe, the plaintiff's expert witness was questioned whether he had adequately 
familiarized himself with the applicable standard of care in existence in 1983 and place 
of the alleged medical negligence, Pocatello, Idaho. Id., 120 Idaho at 295,815 P.2d at 
1035. 
Plaintiff's expert witness testified he had spoke with a physician practicing in 
IdahQ Falls, Idaho to familiarize himself with the applicable standard of care for 
Pocatello, Idaho, and testified there was no local deviation from the national standard of 
care in Pocatello, Idaho. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that 
Idaho Falls, Idaho is approximately fifty miles from Pocatello, Idaho, and therefore, 
Idaho Falls and Pocatello are separate communities as defined by I.C. § 6-1012. Id. 
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case due to the plaintiff's expert 
witness failing to establish actual knowledge and familiarization with the applicable local 
standard of care in Pocatello, Idaho. Id. 
Likewise, in the present case, plaintiffs' failed to prove their expert witnesses, Dr . 
. Blaylock and Dr. Lebaron, possessed actual knowledge regarding the community 
standard of care for Nathan Coonrod, M.D. in Nampa, Idaho in April, May, and June 
2003. Plaintiffs' experts only familiarized themselves regarding the community standard 
of care by consulting with Idaho physicians who practiced outside of the local 
community of Nampa, Idaho. Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Dr. Blaylock and Dr. 
Lebaron obtained actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care in Nampa, Idaho 
by consulting with a family practice physician practicing family medicine in Nampa, 
Idaho, as required by I.C. § 6-1012. 
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Dr. Blaylock and Dr. Lebaron spoke with physicians practicing in Caldwell, 
Meridian, and/or Boise, but not Nampa, Idaho. Caldwell, Meridian, and Boise are 
different "communities" than the community of Nampa, Idaho, as defined by I.C. § 6-
1012. Thus, pursuant to the holding in Gubler v. Boe, plaintiffs failed to establish that 
their experts had "actual knowledge" of the standard of care for a physician practicing 
family medicine in Nampa, Idaho in April, May, and June, 2003 as required by Idaho 
Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. Therefore, this Court should grant defendants' 
JNOV motion due to plaintiffs' failure to establish that their expert witnesses possessed 
actual knowledge of the applicable community standard of care for Dr. Coonrod in April, 
May, and June. 2003 in Nampa, Idaho. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, defendants respectfully request the Court grant 
their Motion for New Trial, or in the alternative, Motion to Amend Judgment for 
Remittitur, and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
flPlj.J.. 
DATED this _ day of June, 2009. 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
B~~~ Steven K. Tolman 
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